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Abstract 
To increase the availability of a pouer plant means also to invest more money 
in the plant. A criterion to weieh the improved availability against the in-
creased plant cost is therefore needed. For this reason, the annual loss func-
tion of a power plant is introduced: the minimum of this function gives the 
best balance between improved availability and increased plant cost. The safety 
requirement is a constraint to the problem of finding the minimum df the ftinc-
tion. The mathematical expressions to calculate the annual loss function are 
derived~ and a numerical example is also included. Some P,eneral probabilistic 
considerations on reactor containers are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the problems, with which the designer of electric power plants is faced1 
is that of constructine the plant in such a way that it can function safely 
and economically. To increase the deeree of safety of a plant is paid always 
by making it to function less economically. In fact the safest plant is that 
which is always in shut down» which means that it does not function at all. 
During normal operation~ it can happen that the plant, due to the failure of 
one of its parts, goes to shut dmm, and does not produce electricity during 
the time in which is being repaired. This results in a loss of money for the 
company which owns the plant. This consideration should drive the designer to 
design a better plant~ in which the failure probability of its parts is reduced. 
But to design a more reliable plant means also to invest more money in it. 
From what we have said? one can already conclude that the desip-ner must weigh 
the improvement obtained in the plant availability against the increased plant 
cost. Scope of this report is to give the criteria uhich allow to find this 
optimum value of the plant availability 1 and; at the same time~ to satisfy the 
safety requirements given by the safety committee. 
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2. Fundamental concepts. Different types of failures. 
From an operational point of vieu, we can think that a plant consists of two 
systems: the °Functional System11 and the ::Safety Systen'1 • 
The "Functional System" is that part of the plant which performs the function 
of the plant~ that is to produce electricity. The '. 1Functional Systemn includes 
those parts of the plant (such as reactor; pumps, heat exchanrers~ etc.)~ which 
all together allow the plant to produce electricity. 
The "Safety Systemr' is that part of the plant Hhich protects the "Functional 
System11 against accidents. 
For this reason, signals coming from the 11~unctional System11 are continuously 
detected by the "Safety System1' (fir.:. J). 
If the signals indicate that a dan2erous situation e,cistss the Safety System 
will shut the plant down. 
He shall call "Functional Gubsystem'1 any part of the functional system which, 
if it fails, does not allow the plant to perform its function at all 1 or at 
least in a safe way. To illustrate this definition" we shall make two examples. 
Let us take the case of a nuclear pouer plant. The pump of the primary coolant 
circuit (fie. J3) is driven by an electric motor uhich is fed from a pot1er 
supply. If the power su!)ply fails, the purap stops, the coolant flo,;·1 decreases, 
and the reactor is not cooled any more. The consequence uill be that the heat 
is not converted into electricity, which means that the functional systen does 
not perform its function any more. In addition, since the reactor is not cooled 9 
the heat produced remains inside it and, if the plant is not shut do~m 9 there 
will be a "disaster11 or a '1bis accident" (core melt dmm). 
The pouer supply is therefore a functional subsyste..rn, because its failure does 
not allou the plant to function. Let us suppo3e nor, that we have tuo r,ower 
supplies, one i10rking and the other in stand-by, connected in such a 1rny that~ 
if the first fails, it is automatically suitched off~ ~rhile the second. is 
automatically switched into operation. In this case the functional subsystem 
is made of both the pouer suprlies~ and each of then will be called nunie1 • 
The functional subsystem fails~ if both tl1e units fail. 
The second example refers also to the primary coolant circuit of a nuclear 
power r,lant. The bearines of the prima.ry coolant pul'lp (fi0 • 13) are cooled 
uith oil, which is maintained in circulation by means of an oil pump. If the 
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oil pump fails, the functional system can continue still for some time to pro-
duce electricity, but not in a safe way. In fact~ if the primary coolant pump 
is not switched off, the bearings will jam and the pump will fail (loss of 
coolant flou accident). The oil pump is also a functional subsystem and, as 
for the case of the power supply, ue can have an :'oil :i:,umps subsystem;' uhich 
consists of two or more oil pumps :1 tr..at is of t,10 or more units. The functional 
subsystems have only one type of failure. Tjis does not mean that they can fail 
only in one uay~ but that their failures have only one consequence~ namely that 
they bring the plant in a so dangerous situation, that plant shut dmm is required. 
Let us take~ for example, a llpouer supplies subsystera;' consistilv: of one unit 
only. The modes of failure of the power supply are many, but the consequence is 
only one: the motor of the primary coolant pump is not driven any more. The units 
of the functional subsystems , 7ill be characterized by only one averaze failure 
rate, oF' which takes into account all the failure modes of the unit. If we 
indicate with lihF(t) 11 the total failure probability density distribution of the 
unit, we have (Appendix 1) 
where 
0 ? = l!l,_e-an-t-im_e_b,_e_t-~-1e_e_n_t_w_o_f_a_1._· 1.,..u_r_e_s_ = 
t = time 
0 = maintenance period~ that is time interval between two F 
preventive replacements (or repairs) of the unit. 
If no preventive maintenance is planned (0r=00)) eq. 1 becomes: 
(2) 
The average failure rate, AF' of a functional subsystem depends upon the charac-
teristics of the units Phich form the subsystem and u,on the way in uhich these 
units are connected (strater;y). The calculc?.tion of :1\/' as function of tr:e unit 
l.' 
characteristics for different stratesies is sho~m in para~raph 5.4. 
The plant '7ill be shut do-..:m from tir1e to time to carry out the maintenance of the 
(1) 
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big components. This maintenance is called 11 routine plant maintenance 11 • 
The maintenaace period "e,11 of a unit belonsing to a functional subsystem can 
be shorte!' thrn that of the 11rontine plant maintenance"? j_f the functional 
subsystem consists at least of two units. In facts in the case in uhich the 
functional scbsystem consists of one unit only, in order to carry out the 
preventive maintenunce of the unit, it is necessary ~o shut the plant down. 
The safety system too can be divided in ;1Safoty Subsystems 1'. For a better under-
standing, we shall illustrate a particular case. Fig. 2 shous a schematic block 
dia3ram of some safety subsystems 1 which protect the reactor of a nuclear pm1er 
plan!: against 2cci<lents. In a safety system we can distinguish three types of 
subsystems a~d exactly 
Subsystems S1l, S!2, S13. They mensure some parameters (such as 
p0~1er, temperatures, pressures~ etc.) of the functional system, 
antl, on the basis of these measurements, decide wether or not 
to shut the plant dmm. 
Subsystem S14. It is an intermediate relays network, which receives 
the dicision taken by the previous subsystens, and transmit it to 
the following subsystem. 
Subsystem SIS. It is a structure of actuators. The actuators are the 
organs, which carry out the decision received from the relays net-
work. In the case of a nuclear reactor the actuators would be the 
safety rods and j_ts associated :nechanisms. In the case of a pump~ 
the actuators would be the electric suitches i1hich connect the pump 
motor to the power supply. 
Uith reference to fi'3. 2, let us suppose that the pouer supplies subsystem (which· 
feeds the motor of the primary coolant pump) fails. The loss of voltage to the 
t · 11 b l b I " 11 • h 1 h · h t d . moor w1. e measure, y t1e n 811 meaeur1.np; c anne s Wll.C are connec e 1.n 
such a uay that, if at least 11k 811
11 out of the "1n811
11 units measure the loss of 
voltage correctly 9 the dP.cision to shut the reactor dmm will be given to S14. 
This mean<'> that at least '1k811
11 units, at::.thc time of the loss of voltage accident, 
must not have al1:cac!y failed :tn such a ,;;1ay that they cannot detect the accident 
any more. Ua shnll call with failure tyyie 11aie that type of failure uhich makes 
the unit (of a safety subsys:em) unable to function correctly Hhen the accident 
occurs. The subsystem SI4 operates in a similar Fay. Hhen S14 receives the shut 
dm-m decision from SI 1 (or S12 or S!3), if 11k814° out of the 
11n814
11 units (relays) 
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operate correctly, it will transmit this decision to subsystem S15. Finally, if 
''k:::as 11 control rods will drop inside the reactor, no big accident will take place 
and the reactor will be shut down. If instead, at the time of the loss of voltat:e 
accident, 
(3) 
out of the "n 11 units don't measure the loss of voltage correctly, no decision Stl 
to shut the reactor dmm is given to subsystem S14. In this case, since the 
primary coolant pump will stop, the primary coolant flow will decrease, and 
this will be detected by the measuring channels of subsystem St 2, which operates 
in a way similar to S 11 • If also subsystem S 12 fails to shut the reactor dmm, 
the reactor outlet coolant temperature will increase,. and this will be detected 
by the measurine channels of subsystem St 3, .:·1hich operates in a way similar to 
S11 and S12. If also subsystem S13 fails to shut the reactor down, there will 
be a big accident (core melt down). 
The big accident (or "disaster") will take place also in the cases in l-1hich 
subsystems S14 and SIS fail to operate correctly, iihen they are required to shut 
the reactor do\m. 
It can also happen that 11k511
11 out of the 11n:::t l 11 units detect the loss of voltage 
to the pump motor, uhen no loss of voltage exists (failure type b). In this case 
the reactor would be erroneously shut do~m (false trip). 
From what we have said above 11 we can conclude that the units of a safety sub-
system can have two types of failures~ failure type "aa and failure type "b". 
Failure ti:i~e n a" is that type of failure~ which makes the unit unable to operate 
when it is asked to operate. 
Failure txEe "b" is that type of failure 11 which mal~es the unit to operate, when 
it is~ asked to operate. 
For a relay mounted in such a way, that its contacts are asked to open when 
there is a danger, the failure type 11 a 11 would occur if the relay becomes unable 
to open its contacts uhen it is asked to do it. The failure type 0 b11 would in-
stead take place, if the relay contacts open without being asked to open. 
The units of the safety subsystems qill be therefore characterized by two avera3e 
failure rates one) p(!, related to failure type 11a;' and the other~ oc, to failure 
~ 0 
type "b11 • 
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In order to find out that a unit of a safety subsystem is failed with failure 
type 11a 11 , it is necessary to test it from time to time. Let us indicate with 
"t8" the checkine period (that is the time interval between two tests), riith 
h!(t) the failure type 11a" probability density distribution of the unit and 
.:: 
with h~(t) the failure type 11b11 probability density distribution of the unit. 
'-' 
He have (Appendix 2) 
PC":! = 
iJ 
and 
uhere 
(4) 
(5) 
e5 = maintenance period~ that is time interval between two preventive 
replacements (or repairs). 
o' = const. s 
o" = const. C' ,._, 
h(t)= total failure probability density distribution given by eq. 5 in 
Appendix 2. 
Fig. 3 shoW3the qualitative behaviour of Ps and f 110 It d II II 0 8 as functions o -5 an t 5 • 
It is understandable that the shorter is 0" and 
•J 
the longer is t 8 , the smaller 
are 0 8 and Ps· 
A safety subsystem is characterized by two parameters 
(i) the reduction coefficient i;Ks' for failure type "aa 
and (ii) the average failure rate ii' AC' ii for failure type "b ,1. 
I., 
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If a functional subsystem fails (for example the poHer supplies subsystem), 
there is a certain probability that one of the safety subsystems TJhich should 
cooperate to shut the reactor down (for example S14) has already failed with 
failure type 11a 11 • This would happen if "m~/1 out of the :rn5
11 units (belonging 
to the safety subsystem) have failed with failure type "a". If n).." is the F 
failure rate of the functional subsystem~ the rate of occurrence au" of the 
event} that, the safety subsystem fails before the functional subsystem does, 
is given by (Appendix 3) 
where 
and 
(6) 
(7) 
p~ 
i) 
= unit averaEe failure rate for failure type "a" given by eq. 4 
ns = number of the units belonging to the safety subsystem 
ms = number of the units which must fail in order to make the 
safety subsystem 
-r = checking period. s 
to fail (failure type "a:1} 
Fies. 4, 5 and 6 show the reduction coefficient aKS II as function of "ps -r~' 
for different values of 11n~11 and am/' . 
._ ..., 
If we now ask for the rate of occurrence 11u11 ~ of the event that tuo safety 
subsystems (i and j) fail before the functional subsystem fail; we have 
(Appendix 3) 
(!3) 
where 
T? 
= reduction coefficient of the safety subsyster'.l "i!f 
··s1 
KSj = reduction coefficient of the safety subsystem ;ij fl 
11Si;Sj = couplinz coefficient 
- 11 -
HSi;Sj is given by 
(ml'.' • + I ) (:.1,, • + l ) 
.:;l. C, J 
(9) 
For the case of 11N11 safety subsystems we have 
where 
u = Ali' [ ~ I(s • J E:s 1 • "2 S1'J 
- • 1 l. s,Vooc,o,., 1.= 
N 
II (m!:Ji+J) 
Ii = _i_=_J ___ _ 
·st ;S2; ••• ;SN l'J 
E m~. 
• l .. l. 1.= 
1 + 
(10) 
(l t) 
The failure rate ">i.8
11 for failure type 11b11 of a safety subsystem is civen by 
(Appendix 4) 
where 
\:: 
oS 
(12) = ..., JlS-iµS f n(' 
J 
,) 
J.9.-J-i)! E ·-· E 
i=o 0 s q=ns-ts+J+i <1 ! 
crc = unit average failure rate for failure type 11h 11 given by eq. 5 
,::, 
Jl.8 = number of units uhich must fail (failure type 11h 11 ) in order to 
make the safety subsystem to fail. 
µc = average repair rate of a unit, equal to the reciprocal of the v 
mean time needed to repair the unit. (defined by eq. 13) 
µ(' = ------
'-' j 00 t f\;Ct)dt 
0 
(13) 
where gc(t) is the repair probability density distribution of a unit. i:J 
Since µ8/08 is usually extrenely la.rse 7 eq. 12 can be written as follows 
(14) 
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For safety subsystems like structures of measurin8 channels or relays networks, 
we have always 
(15) 
i 
For the safety actuators subsystems, we can have either eq. lS or 
(16) 
In the case of the reactor actuators subsystem (~15 in fig. 2), if one control 
rod alone is sufficient to reduce the reactor power to a low value, we have 
Q,S15 = t (17) 
and therefore from eq. 12 
(18) 
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3. A simple model. The annual loss function "z;i. 
In order to understand the type of problem which we intend to solve~ let us 
start to consider a very simplified model of the electric plant. 
At a given time the plant can be only in one of the follouine states 
State 110 11 The plant is in nnormal operation:i which means 
that it is producin3 electric power. "Normal Operation·
1 
State II I 11 
"Shut Down" 
The plant is in nshut do~m", which means that 
it is not producine electric power, but that 
it can be repaired and started up again. 
State "2" 
"Disaster0 
The plant is in the ;:disaster" state uhich means 
that it is so heavily damazed (as a consequence 
of a big accident), that it cannot be repaired 
any more. 
Pig. 7 shows a schematic flow diagram of the various states of the plant. 
The plant, as seen in para~raph 2 ~ consists of the nfunctional system11 and 
of the 11safety system':. A failure of the i.functional system11 leads to a :'bi-:i: 
accident"~ if the safety system does not shut the plant down. 
The plant 3oes from state 110 11 to state al 11 in the two followin: cases: 
a) failure of the 1;functional system11 followed by a correct action 
of the safety system. 
b) false trip 1 due to a failure of the safety syste~. This means 
that the safety system Ghuts the plant dmm while the functional 
system is operatin~ correctly. He have called this type of failure 
of the safety system failure type 11bii. 
The plant goes from state "0" to state .12;1 (disaster) uhen tl1e functional system 
fails and the safety syste:!l c1oes not shut the plant <lonn. rre have called this 
type of the failure of the safety system _failure type na". 
Ue introduce nou the followins symbols 
1 (t) = f)robability that the system 0 is in state non at ti,:i.e nt;' 
ql(t) = probability t:-:at the system is in state n) n at time lit!' 
02(t) = probability that the syotem is in state :;2:1 at time ne: 
A~ = failure rate of the functional system 
.I: 
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KS= reduction coefficient of the safety system 
If = plant repair rate~ that is the reciprocal of the mean 
time needed to repair the plant 
AS= rate of occurrence of a false trip. 
The rate of occurrence "v/ that a big accident occurs (safety system fails with 
failure type "a11 before the furtctional system fails) will be e;iven by 
(1) 
The rate of occurrence 11 u'' j that the plant eoes to shut dotrn as a consequence 
of the failure of the functional system, is 
Since 
u = (1-K )A S F 
is very small (<t0-5)j eq. 2 can be written 
Typical values for A:,,i A5, 'I' and KS are the folloi:rinc 
"F = 0.1 T I/year 
"'-' 
= 0.01 f C.05/year 
" 
'I' = 1() JOO/years 
I~S < 10-
5 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
From 4 to 7~ we get the expression 8 which holds in the practical cases 
(3) 
In the following analytical treatment, i::,e suppose that \.,; Ac, and 'l' are constant. 
-' iJ 
This means that failure and repair probability density distributions are supposed 
to be exponential. 
The following equations can be uritten (fii:;. 7) 
(9) 
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(JO) 
(I J) 
(12) 
where 11t1' indicates the time. 
Only three of the four equations 9~ JO, 11 and 12 are independent. For instance? 
6:J• JI can be easily obtained from eqs. 9, 10 and 12. 
The solution of the system of eqs. 9~ JO and 12 is described in Appendix 5. 
expression G is satisfied 
Here we write the approximate expression of "Q n under the condition that the 
0 
Eq. 13 can be written as follows 
Q ::: A • R 
0 
where 
and 
"A" is a function which has the following characteristics 
[A]t=o = I 
and 
1¥ 
lim A = ·'¥+>- +>-
t-+oo F S 
= A 
co 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(13) 
Due to the large values of "'!'11 (eq. 6), 11,\11 reaches A
00 
in a very short period 
of time. 
For "R" we have instead 
and 
[R]t=o = 1 
limR=O 
t~ 
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(19) 
(20) 
Due to the very small values of KS>..F, 11R11 is practically equal to ril" for the 
all plant lifetime. We have therefore that the average plant availability 11.A11 
durine the time interval 11 t 11 is given by 
A= l jtQ dt ~ l ltA dt = A +(1-A) 1 l [t-exu{-(11'+>.. +A )tl] (21) 
t o t oo oo li'+A~+"c t • F S 
0 0 ~ ~ 
For a time interval 
(22) 
eq. 21 becomes 
(23) 
,:An is called point availability and A
00 
asymptotic availability. 11A
00
11 can also 
be expressed as follows 
A = operation time 
00 operation time+ repair time (24) 
It is very interesting to notice that the point availability "A'\ given by eq. 15, 
uould be the exact solution of the system of eqs. 9 to 12 in the particular case 
K5=o, that is ,men we suppose that the probability of the plant to be in the 
absorbing state (disaster) is equal to zero. 
Appendix 6 shous that eq. 23 is valid also in the case in ,mich failure and 
repair probability density distributions are not exponential. In this case Ii'~ 
"F" "s are only avera3e values. 
11 t-A00
11 is called 11unavailabiliti1 and we shall indicate it with the symbol "U11 
u = 
X +AS F 1-A = ----
oo 1¥+\,.+AS 
(25) 
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We shall now introduce the annual loss function "Z". 
When the plant is in shut down, it does not produce electricity. The expected 
amount of money lost in a year because of the unavailability of the plant is 
where 
PTyU 
P = power of the plant (kH) 
T = number of hours in a year, during uhich the plant is 
planned to be in operation (hrs) 
y = price of the kWh minus price of the fuel which ptodtices 
a kWh. 
(26) 
We shall call the quantity given by-eq. 26: annual unavailability cost. 
The value of "y" is very difficult to estimate. It depends upon many factors 
such as the possibility to increase the load of other plants, or to buy the 
energy from another electricity producer. The price of the kHh, due to the 
"unavailability" of the plant occurred during the day, will be different from 
that due to the "unavailability" occurred durini the night. 
The evaluation of "y" is by itself a big problem which exceeds the limits of 
this report. We shall suppose that y has been elseuhere already evaluated. 
Some money will be lost, to repair and start the plant up after a failure is 
occurred. He shall indicate this amount of money uith "B". The expected total 
amount of money lost in a year for repair and start-up will be 
(27) 
We shall call the quantity given by eq. 27~ annual shut do~m cost. 
We shall indicate wit!1 "C" the .!!m,nual subsystems cost;i,, that is the cost per 
year of all those parts of the plant which contribute to its "unavailability". 
Ttis cost will include the capital costs per year for design, construction 
and installation, the operation costs, and the maintenance costs. 
We can now calculate the expected amount of money lost in a year 11Z11 (annual 
loss function). Taking into account eqs. 26 and 27, and the definition of 11C", 
ue can write 
(28) 
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From eqs. 25 and 28 we get finally 
Z = /IJ/! AT+ r + B) (:>,F +AS) + C V F s ) 
\. 
(29) 
We notice that the first term (on the riBht side of eq. 29) is a function which 
increases with ";\F+;,.5
11
• The term iic11 uill instead decrease with 11 ;\:?+;\5", for 
the simple reason that the less the parts of the plant will fail, the more 
they will cost. 
The function "Z", being the sun of tuo terms, one increasing and the other 
decreasing with ;';\r+;\5;
1
,, will have a minimum. Ue shall indicate with 
and 
respectively the values of AF and AS which give the minimum value of 11 Z" (Zmin). 
The problem, 'ilhich the designer must solve, is to find (AF)opt' 0.s\pt and 
Z .• Let us suppose that we have already found these values. 
min 
We can now define a second problem. The safety committee requires that,, for 
safety reasons? the rate of occurrence of a big accident (KSAF) should not 
exceed a value "u II which is fixed by the safety rer;ulations. TJe can write 
max 
therefore 
(30) 
(31) 
The safety system must be designed in such a wa.y~ that its reduction coefficient 
"Ksn does not exceed the limit value r;iven by the expression 31. In effect, the 
fullfillment of 31 will have a feedback to the evaluation of Z because 11 ;\ 11 
min S 
depends too on the characteristics of the safety system. Condition 31 must 
therefore be regarded as a constraint to the problen to mini!nize "Z11 • This will 
become clearer with the numerical example which uill be shovm in the following 
paragraph. 
- 21 -
= (104 + 1.Q2.) D.M./year 
aF 
(13) 
Fig. 9 shows "ZF" as function of "ar" for different values of "nr"· 
To calculate the cu~ves of fig. 9 we have used the following numerical 
values for the known parameters 
2 µF = 10 /years 
p Ty+ B = 2•106 D.M. 
'¥ 
(14) 
(15) 
The "Safety subsystem" (measuring channels) consists of "ns'' units all 
in active redundancy. The network is built in such a way that, if the 
voltage to the stator fails and 11 m" out of the "ns" units also fail 
' s 
(failure type "a"), the safety system will not shut the reactor down and 
there will be a big accident (reactor melt down). 
For the "safety subsystem" we have the following expressions (para. 2 
eqs. 7, 13) 
Since we have 
R, 
s 
eq. 17 becomes 
AS 
= (m8+l)!(n8-m8)! 
is 
as 
( eq. 14 of para. 2) 
= ns + 1 - m s 
(ns)! 
(ns+l-ms) 
(5 s 
= Cms-1)! (ns-ms) µs 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
The symbols of eqs. 16 to 19 have the following meaning 
PS = unit failure rate for failure type "a" 
t 
s 
= checking period 
(j s = unit failure rate for failure type "b" 
µs = unit repair rate, that is reciprocal of the mean time 
repair a unit after a failure type 11b 11 
to 
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tS = number of units which must fail in order to make the 
subsystem to fail (failure type "b") 
The cost "Cs" of the safety subsystem is given by 
where 
c8 = annual cost of a unit 
Taking into account eq. 16, the constraint 7 becomes 
u 
max 
<-= 
;\F 
(20) 
(21) 
For the sake of simplicity, we shall suppose that only one type of measuring 
channel is available on the market and that 11 , 8
11 has already been chosen. 
For the designer therefore, the following values will be fixed 
O' s = 1/year 
P s 's = 
10-3 
4 
µs = 10 /year 
2 
C - 10 D.M./year s -
Fig. 10 shows the limit curve 
K 
max 
as function of 11;\F"· 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
The following two tables give ";\s" (eq. 19); z8 (eq. 6) and KS (eq. 16) 
as functions of "ms" and 11 n8
11 
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Table 1 
ms = 2 
ns /1.s zs KS 
-1 (D.M./year) (years ) 
3 6•10-4 l.5"103 10-6 
4 2.4•10""7 4•102 2·10-6 
5 1.2·10-10 5.102 3.33·10 -6 
6 7.2·10-14 6·102 5•10-6 
Table 2 
ms = 1 
ns /1.s zs KS 
(year-1 ) (D.M./year) 
2 10-4 2-102 10-3 
3 6•10-8 3·102 1.5•10-3 
4 2.4•10-11 4·102 2•10-3 
5 1.2•10-
14 5•102 2.5•10-3 
From the analysis of figs. 5 and 10 and of the tables 1 and 2, we can 
easily conclude that the designer will obtain the minimal annual loss 
"Z . " and at the same time will satisfy the constraint given by the 
min' 
safety committee, if he will take the following decisions~ 
(i) he chooses, among all the types of power supply units 
available on the market, the type No. 2 which is 
' characterized by 
and 
oF = 0.1/years (27) 
(28) 
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(ii) he decides to have one power supply unit workinr.; and the other 
in stand-by, that is 
n.., = 2 
,: 
(29) 
(iii) he decides to have 4 measuring channels so connected that 113'' 
of them must fail (failure type 1'b:1) in order to sive a false 
trip. 
nc, • 4 
,J 
(30) 
(31) 
~Jith the numerical values 27 ~ 28~ 29 9 30 and 31 ~ we ~et 
A = to-4/year F (32) 
and 
Z.,., ;;: 22 • OOO t .:I. /year 
,! 
Zc:- ;; 400 D .?t. /year 
,, 
Z•Z'F+Z,..=22 • 400 :: .i.::. /year 
- ..i 
It is very interestine to notice fr9m eqs. 33 and 34 that 
Z <<.., C: ""1<' 
...., ~ 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
uhich means that the r.iinimum of the partial annual loss 11 Z~1' of a safety sub-
.:, 
system is much smaller than that of ,the partial annual loss az ... 11 of a functional 
suosystem. 
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5. The annual loss "zi, as function of the characteristics of the units of the 
---
5. I Generals 
The annual loss function 11 Z11 is ~iven by the sur1 of three ter.ns 
Z = PTyU + "3 + C (I) 
11PTyU11 is the 11annual unavailability cost;', and represents the exnected 
amount of noney lost each year, because of t:'-1e unavailability of 
the plant. 
"B11 is ti.1e 11annual shut dorm cost;', and represents t:1e expected m:1.ount 
of money needed each year to re?air the rlant any tiBe shut dotm 
occurs and to brinz it 1..>ack into normal operation. 
ucn is tl1e i:annual subsystems cost", and represents the total co-.;t per 
year of all the subsystems 1:ihic'1 contribute to t::e plant unavaila-
bility. This coct includes the capital; operation ani ~aintenance 
costs per year of t~e sucsystem3. 
In the next para3raphs •,e s:-:all e1cpress 1izri as functiou of the characteristics 
of the units of t~e plant. 
5. 2 ~he 11plant unavailability'\ U j as function of the characteristics of the 
functional and safety subsyst~ 
In parazraph 3 we have defined three possible states of the nlant: normal 
operation, shut do,m, ani disaster. 
In reality the "shut down" state is not only one state~ but a collection of 
different states uhich :,ave in common the tuo followin~ pro;_)erties 
(i) uhen t:1e ;."lant is in one of the:,e states) no electric power 
is produced 
(ii) it is possiule to rerair the plant and to brin3 it to :inornal 
O:.)erationti. 
Fig. 11 shows a schematic flow dia[:raT:1 of the various states o They are 
Ctate 0 = normal ooere.tion 
8tates I to n = shut Jo•m 
State J = disaster 
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Each state "iH of the "N11 shut down states is characterized by the failure rate 
11ui 11 , the repair rate "'l'i" and the shut dmm cost "r\'1. which is the cost to 
repair the plant and to brin~ it back into normal operation. 
As seen in paragraph 3, the probability 11Q
0
11 that the plant at time "t" is in 
state "O" is given by 
where 
0 := AR 
·o 
(I) 
(2) 
and "A" is the point availability, which is calculated by supposing that the 
probability of the plant to be in the absorbing state (disaster state) is 
equal to zero. 
If we neglect the absorbing state and indicate with 11S/ the probability that 
the plant at time 11t" is in state "i" (i=l ;2 ••• H), we can write the following 
equations (fig. 11) 
and 
dA u 
dt = - A E 
i=l 
N 
u. + 
l. 
E Si= 1 - A 
i=l 
(4) 
(i=l,2; ••• N) (5) 
(6) 
The above uN+2" equations are not all independent; one of them can be obtained 
from the others "iHl ". Since we are interested in the asymptotic availability 
"A00", we can solve the equations 4 to 6 by putting all the derivatives equal 
too. 
From the equations 5 we set 
ui 
<! - A 
~i,.:x, - w:- <X> 
1. 
where 
S = Si(oo) i<X> 
(i=l,2, ••• N) 
Putting the eqs. 7 in 6~ we obtain 
N ui 
I-A = A E 
<X> co 
'Pi i=l 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
and finally 
I A = ---=--
co N 
I + E 
i=l 
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We shall now introduce the symbol 11A 11 so defined ioo 
(JO) 
(II) 
"A n would be equal to the asymptotic plant availability "A" in the particular ioo co 
case in uhich the state "i" is the only possible shut down state, that is ·when 
\_) = 0 j 
and 
Taking into account eq. JI, eq. 10 becomes 
A = ··---.-,T ;..._-~-
co ,.,; )-,.loo 
1 + E 
i=l Ai00 
Introducing the "plant unavailabilityll U1 we get finally from eq. 14 
-N Ui 
l: --=-
i=l 1-ui 
u =------
-i=l 1-U i 
where Ui is called "partial unavailability" and it is given by 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
Eqs. 15 and 16 have been obtained for constant values of ui and '¥1 • This corres-
ponds to the case in which the failure probability density distribution "f
1
(t) 11 
and the repair probability density distribution 11ui(t) 11 are both exponential. 
However, due to the conclusions reached in Appendix 6, these two equations 
are also valid in the case in which 11fi{t)" and "ui(t)" are not exponential. 
In this last case "ui" and 11 '¥1" are average values given respectively by eqs. 
5 and 4 of para A6.7. 
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If one thinks to all the possible combinations of failures among functional 
and safety subsystems, he would conclude that the number of shut down states 
in a plant is tremendously high. For this reason it is convenient to divide 
be shut down states ih groups which are chosen with a criterionexplained below. 
Eq. 15 can be written as follows 
....!L :I: 1-u 
N U 
I: _i_ 
i=l 1-u i 
( 17) 
Eq. 17 suggests the idea that, to get the unavailability "U. 11 of a group of 
J 
11
-p3.reial unavailabilities", one has to sum the partial unavailabilities in 
b = lo! lowing way 
Wr€re 
u.i J 
1-uji 
"j'' indicates group "j 11 
"ji" indicates shut do"m state 11ji11 belonging to group "j'' 
Uji = partial not availability due to shut down state nji" 
nj = number of the shut down states belonging to group "j". 
(18) 
Fir. 12 shows a schematic diagram of the major components of a nuclear power 
plant. A major component, with associated auxiliary parts to make it to function 
an 1 safety subsystens to protect it against accidents, will be called "block". 
A '\1lock'1 is therefore a croup of subsystems. A "block" will be said unavailable, 
when it does not perform the function for uhich it has been built. For instance, 
th£ primary coolant pump (block No. 2) trill be not available, if it does not 
maintain the primary coolant in circulation. All the partial unavailabilities, 
which contribute to the unavailability of a block, will be grouped together to 
git·e the unavailability of the block. 
With reference to fig. 12,, ue can define the following nine blocks 
Block No. 1 Reactor 
Block Uo. 2 Primary Coolant Pump 
Block Ho. 3 Steam Generator 
Block no. 4 Primary Circuit 
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Block Ho. 5 Turbine 
Block No. 6 Electric Generator 
Block No. 7 Condenser 
Block No. g Hater Pump 
Block Uo. 9 Secondary Circuit 
The division of the plant 1n blocks is a matter of convenience and is somewhat 
arbitrary. The designer may find mote convenient to divide the plant in blocks 
different from those listed above. 
The plant unavailability "U11 ·will be given by: 
i:1 u. 
l-r-J-
1-u - j==l 1-uj (19) 
where "H" is the total nur.iber of the blocks. In the case of fig. 12 we have M==9. 
One can also divide the blocks in sub-blocks and these in subsystems. 
The "block unavailability" "Uj" will be a function of the 11partial unavailabilities" 
'tJji" accordine to eq. 18. Ue shall now analyse an examr,le to show how to calcu-
late "U" j • 
Fig. 13 shows a schematic diagram of the primary coolant pump LBlock Ho. ~7. 
The primary coolant pump is driven by an electric motor, which is fed from the 
power supplies subsysten. The puop bearings are cooled with oil, which is 
maintained in circulation by means of the oil pumps subsystem. It is important 
to point out that this example is made purposely simple? because we intend to 
illustrate the principles and not to solve a practical case. Let us now continue 
with our example. The safety system has the purpose to save the major components 
(reactor, primary coolant pump) against accidents. It is clear that? from safety 
point of vieu, the reactor uill have first priority. This neans that? if a 
choice must be done between reactor and pump> we shall choose to save the reac-
tor first and after the pump. If the oil pressure decreases, (which is dangerous 
for the bearinr;s), it will be detected by the "oil pressure measurin:; channels" 
(S21), which will first shut the reactor down (through the intermediate relays 
network S14 and the reactor actuators SIS) and after 1-Jill suitch the pump drive 
motor off (through the intermediate relays network S22 and the pum'? actuators 
S23). This sequence of actions is obtained through a feedback from the reactor 
actuators (Sl5) to the input of the intermediate relays net,tork (S22). 
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If the voltage to the pump drive motor fails, the pump will stop and this llill 
produce a big reactor accident (loss of coolant flow accident). For this reason 
the voltage is measured by the "voltaee measurinc channels'' (St l), which uill 
shut the reactor dmm through S 14 and S 15. 
The safety system includes also tHo other trips: one for lorr coohnt flow (S12) 
and the other for high reactor outlet coolarit teMperaturc (S13). 
We shall call "initial event" any failure of a function2.l subsystem or of a 
safety subsystem, which bri.ngs the plant to a failed state (shut dmm or 
disaster). For the sake of simplicity, we shall suppose that only some of the 
functional subsystems belonging to the blor!k no. 2 (primary coolant pump) can 
fail. They are 
Functional Subsystem No. F21 = Oil pumps subsystem 
Functional Subsystem Ho. F22 = Oil circuit subsystem (oil leakage) 
Functional Subsystem No. F23 = Power supplies subsyst-zm 
A functional subsystem will be indicated uith the letter 1;r11 followed by two 
or more figures, the first figure being the numbe:~ of the block to which the 
functional subsystem belongs. 
The safety subsystems, l-Jhich belong to the block No. 2, are those tvhich protect 
the primary coolant pump and exactly 
Safety Subsystem S2J = measuring channels of oil pressure 
Safety Subsystem S22 = pump intermediate relays network 
Safety Subsystem S23 = pump actuators 
A safety subsystem vill be indicated uith the letter "it' followed by two or 
more figures~ the first figure being the number of the block to uhich the 
safety subsystem belonss. 
The safety subsystem S21 acts on the intermediate relays netuo:rk S14 and S22, 
and protects both primary coolant pump and reactor against accidents. The 
safety subsystem ::;21 can therefore be assigned either to the block no. 2 
(primary coolant pump) or to the block I1o. I that is the reactor. 
He have thought to assigne the structure of the oil pressure measuring channels 
(S21) to the block of the primary coolant pump (No. 2), because the oil pressure 
is strictly related to the good operati.on of the pump bearings. In this case 
the unavailability of the reactor is a consequence of the not availability of 
the primary coolant pump? because the pump is not allowed to function uith 
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too low oil pressure at the bearings. 
The assignement of a safety subsystem to a block instead of another may be a 
matter of personal judgement of the designer. But the designer must be very 
careful, when he makes the division of the plant in blocks, that he does not 
assigne the same shut down state to two different blocks. In order to avoid 
the 
this error, he must check that list of the shut dmm states grouped in a 
block contains only those having as ''initial events" the failures of the 
functional and safety subsystems which he has assigned to the block. 
The safety subsystems 
S 11 (measuring channels of steltor voltaee) 
S12 (measuring channels of primary coolant flou) 
S13 (measuring channels of reactor outlet temperature) 
S14 (reactor intermediate relays network) 
S15 (reactor actuators) 
belong to the reactor block (Ho. 1) because they protect only the reactor 
against accidents. 
Nou we can illustrate the procedure to calculate the not availability u2 of 
block No. 2. The initial events which must be considered are only those linked 
tlt:> failures of the subsystems belonging to bloci.: Uo. 2 and exactly: F21, F22, 
F23, S21, S22, S23. For the safety subsystems only the failure type 11b11 can 
initiate a shut down. 
The shut down states of block 2 are the following 
Shut down State No. 21 = Oil pmnps subsystem failed 
Shut down State Ho. 22 = Oil circuit subsystem failed 
Shut down State Ho. 23 = Power supplies subsystem failed 
Shut down State No. 24 = Primary coolant pump failed 
Shut down State no. 25 = False Trip (failure type 11b0 of a safety subsystem). 
He want to point out that the failure of the pr:i.mary coolant pump (shut dmm 
s.tate 24) can be due either to the failure of the oil pumps subsystem~ or to 
that of the oil circuit. Strictly speakin3: we should have two different shut 
down states with primary coolant punp failed. However, since the time needed 
to repair the pump is much lon8er than those needed to repair the oil pumps 
and the oil circuit, we can group the two shut dmm states together in one alone. 
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The same considerations have guided us in eroupins all the false trips in one 
state alone (state 25). 
In general we can say that all the shut down states, which belong to the same 
block, and which are characterized by the same (or alI!lost the same) repair rate 
11
'1' 11 and shut down cost 11 8 11 , can be grouped in one state alone. This state will 
have the same repair rate and repair cost, and a failure rate equal to the sum 
of the failure rates of all the shut down states which have been grouped to-
gether. 
Fig. 14 shows the trees to go from the initial events to the shut dmm states 
for block No. 2. Each tree is shown in details from fig. 15 to fig. 19. These 
trees give all the minimal paths to go from the initial events to the shut down 
state to which the tree refers. 
From the analysis of these trees, one realizes immediately that, in order to 
go to the shut down state, some subsystems are required to fail and some other 
safety subsystems are instead required to function. At the time of the failure 
of a functional subsystem, the probability that a safety subsystem (related to 
it) has not failed is much higher than the probability that it has already 
failed. He shall not make therefore any appreciable error in the evaluation of 
the failure rate of a minimal path~ if we suppose that the safety subsystem, 
whkh is required to function, has a probability equal to 1 to function. 
The table of fig. 20 shows all the minimal paths of all the trees belonginc to 
block No. 2. Here, for each minimal path, only the subsystems which arc required 
to fail are shown. The minimal paths are shown horizontally: the sign 11+11 in 
the column of a subsystem indicates that the subsystem is required to fail. 
For the safety subsystems we have, as usually~ the two types of failure "a" 
and "b". 
He shall indicate with "u" the rates of occurrence (or failure rates) of the 
miniI!lal paths, with 11 AF11 the failure rates of the functional subsystems and 
with 11 >..8
11 the failure rates type 11b 11 of the safety subsystems. 
For the shut down state 21 and 22 (fi3. 20) we have respectively 
(20) 
(21) 
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For the shut down state 23 we have 
(22) 
Looking at fig. 20, one realizes immediately that the rates of occurrence of 
the minimal paths 232 and 233 are much smaller than the rate of occurrence of 
the minimal path 231 
(23) 
and 
(24) 
where K811 and K812 are the reduction coefficients respectively of the safety 
subsystems SI 1 and S12 and u511 ;St 2 is the coupling coefficient betweeh the 
safety subsystems SIi and SI2. Both these coefficients have been defined in 
para. 2. 
Taking into account 23 and 24 1 eq. 22 becomes 
(25) 
For the shut down state 24, we notice the followinr; (fig. 20) 
(26) 
and 
(27) 
Taking into account 26 and 27, we can urite (fig. 20) 
Now we have 
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(33) 
(34) 
where with 11K "we have indicated the reduction coefficients of the various s 
safety subsystems. 
Taking into account eqs. 29 to 34, eq. 28 becomes 
(35) 
For the shut do,m state 25 we notice that (fig. 20) 
(36) 
and 
(37) 
Taking into account the expressions 36 and 37, we can write 
(38) 
Since we have (fig. 20) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
eq. 38 becomes 
(42) 
Eqs. 20, 21, 25, 35 and 42 gives the rates of occurrence of the ~hut dovm 
states of block 2 as function of the characteristics of the functional and 
safety subsystems. 
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Since the not availability of block No. 2 is given by 
5 
E 
i=l 
1 + 
we have to calculate all the repair rates 11 1¥21
11
• 
(43) 
The repair rate 11 1¥2/ is the reciprocal of the mean time needed to bring the 
power station from shut dmm state "2i 11 back into normal operation (state 0). 
This mean time must include the Ume needed to repair the subsystems which 
have failed and that needed to start the plant up again. The repair rates are 
therefore also very much dependent upon the i-,ay in which the repair actions 
are carried out and organized (for example upon the number of the repair crews). 
Their values must be obtained by collecting and analysing data coming from 
experience gained ,,ith the operation of previous pmrer plants similar to that 
which the designer takes under consideration. 
In general for a block "j" having "Nj" shut down states, ve can write 
F 
~- ~ . 
J u.i 
E J 
1= I u .. +'!' •. u. Jl. Jl. (44) = 
J N. J uji 
I + E 
i=l uj1+1¥ji 
5.3 The overlapping coefficient. Its definition and its influence on the 
"plant unavailability" 
Taking into account that 
ui = -------------------------- = _t_o_i 
average time interval betucen tt-10 shut dmm states 111 11 
and 
'l'i = 
average time needed to bring the plant into operation from shut 
dm·m state "i II tri 
(1) 
(2) 
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-the partial urlavailability U. (eq. 16 of para. 5.2) can also be ~ifritten as 
l. 
follous 
t i+t . o ri 
(3) 
Putting eq. 3 in eq. 15 of para 5.2, we set for the plant unavailability 11U11 
lJ t 
ri E 
t i=l oi u =------
N tri 
I + E 
i=l toi 
If we indicate with 11T II a long time interval) ue have 
0 
T (1-U) 
0 
t = ----
oi a. 
l. 
where aa." is the expected munber of times that the shut dovm state 
l. 
(4) 
(5) 
11 i 11 occurs in the time interval "T 11. 
0 
Putting 5 in 4 0 we get finally 
E a. t . 
i ri i=I u = ~...:...._ __ _ 
T 
0 
= 
T 
r 
T 
0 
(6) 
where "T O is the total time during which the plant is in shut down. This total 
r 
repair time is given, as shmm by eq. 6, by summin3 the lengths of time 11ai tr/', 
~-,here "a t . 11 is the total lenath of time spent by the plant in the shut dovm in ·' 
state "i1'. This means that, in the model developed in para 5.2, no overlapping 
among the individual repair times "a.t . 11 has been taken into account. He have 
i r1 
practically supposed that a failure of a subsystem creates a situation so 
dangerous for the plant) that immediate shut dmm is required. 
:1any tines t:1e failure of a subsystem does not bring the pouer station in a 
so dangerous situation t11at inmediate shut dorm is required. In other uords, 
there are different dezrees of danger. Take,for instance, the case of the pres-
sure of the oil uhich cools the bearinss of the primary coolant pump (fig. 13). 
If a leakaze occurs in the oil circuit 0 the pressure uill start to decrease 
and, uhen it falls beyond a certain value, there uill be an alam. The opera-
ting crew will find out \That has ea.used this alarm, and 0 on the basis of the 
evaluation of the amount of oil t,hich is beinc lost from the oil circuit; can 
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decide either to shut the plant doun and to repair the oil circuit immediately, 
or to wait for the next routine maintenance. It may hapr,en that, while waiting 
for the next routine plant maintenance, the oil pressure decreases beyond a 
value so low that the safety system shuts automaticaliy the plant dmm. On the 
other hand1 it tnay also happen that 1 ,;rhile waitinf:'. for the routine plant mainte-
nance, the failure of another subsysteI'l occurs, which shuts the plant do"t-m 9 and 
then both the damae;es will be repaired at the same time. 
The above considerations bring to the conclusion that the repair times for the 
various subsystems may overlap one with another. This etfect 1 as already said) 
has not been taken into account in the model described in para 5.2. The der,ree 
of overlappi.ne depends upon the type of the plant, the rapair policy followed 
by the crew uhich operates the plant etc. 
It seems convenient therefore to define an 11overlapnin1? coefficient". s • to 
0 ~ I p' 
be determined from operating experience. For the definition of this coefficient 
we should refer to the partial unavailabilil:ies Ui. Since this would be probably 
too complicate because of the large number of shut down states, i1e shall refer 
to the unavailabilities of the blocks. 
Hith reference to fi 0• 12, iJe shall define 11 s ii as follows (according to a defini-P 
tion suggested by Dr. Vetter and his coworkers of the R.H.E. Essen) 
where 
s p 
11 u. U E _L __ 
. 1 1-u. 1-u = J= J 
11 u. U 
E _ __J_ - .-..E!.... 
. I 1-U. I-U J= J m 
U = plant unavailability 
Uj = "unavailability" of block "j" 
(7) 
U = unavailability of the block "m'' characterized by having the 
m 
maximum a-raon3 the block unavailabilities "U :i j 
M = number of blocks (equal to 9 in fig. 12) 
From 7 we get 
u 
1-u = (1-s) p 
11 u. U 
J m E ·-- + s --1-U. p 1-U j=l J m 
(8) 
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The overlappine coefficient "s II lies always between O and 1 p 
0 < s < 1 p 
lJhen there is no overlappingj we have 
s = 0 p 
and eq. e becomes 
u l1 ~ 
1-U = E 1-U. j=l J 
which is equal to eq. 19 of para 5.2. 
The case 
s = l p 
corresponds to complete overlapping. 
(9) 
( 10) 
( 1 1) 
( 12) 
Hith complete overlapping we mean the case, in which the repairs of the blocks 
uould be all carried out within the repair time of the block which has the 
maximum unavailability U. 
m 
In this case eq. 8 becomes: 
u um 
1-U = 1-U 
!'.l 
(13) 
5.4 The average failure rate of a functional subsystem as function of the 
characteristics of its units for different strateRies 
In paragraph 5. 2 we have shmm how the "plant unavailability 11U11 can be expressec1. 
as function of the failure rates 11 >.F 11 and ">.'3" of the functional and safety 
subsystems and of the reduction coefficients "K"" of th~ safety subsystems. Ue 
.., 
want now to express the failure rate 11 >.F" of a functional subsyster:i as function 
of the characteristics of its units. The failu:re rate ">.F" depends also upo:1 
the type of strategy which is adopted. Here we give the results only for a 
limited number of strategies. The details of the mathematical developments 
are given in Appendix 7. 
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5 .4. 1 Strategy 1 : Functidnd subsystem consisting of a unit only 
The subsystem fails if the unit fails we have simply 
(1) 
where 
t = time 
oF = average failure rate of the unit 
hF(t) = failure probability density distribution of the unit 
0 = maintenance period F 
In the case in which no preventive maintenance is planned (0r,, = 00), eq. I 
becomes 
A = a = I 
F F loo 
t hF(t)dt 
0 
(2) 
5.4.2 Strater,y 2~ Functional subsystem consisting of two units one working and 
the other in stand-by. :No preventive maintenance. 
If the workinz unit fails, it is automatically switched off, while the stand-by 
unit is at the same time automatically switched into operation. The failed unit, 
after repair, is connected a~ain as stand-by unit. The subsystem fails if the 
unit, which is workinfh fails before the repair of the other unit has been 
completed. 
We have 
" = 
oF 
F 1 + I 
* 1 - lim (hF•GF) 
s-+o 
(3) 
where 
GF(t) = repair cumuletive probability distribution of the unit= 
= lt ~ (t)dt (4) op 
0 
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gF(t) = repair probability density distribution of the unit 
=------ (5) 
s = complex variable of the Laplace domain 
"*" indicates Laplace transformation 
For the particular case in which the failure rrobability distribution is 
exponential 
= aF exp(-a.,,.t) 
- £ 
eq. 3 becomes 
>.F - .. 1 
1 + ------------
! - ~~gF(t) exp(-crFt)dt 
If also 'r(t) is exponential 
git) = µF exp(-µFt) 
we have 
where 
µ~=repair rate of the unit 
.. 
Since µF/aF is usually very large~ eq. 9 can be written as follows 
>. ~ 
F 
a 2 
F 
µF 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
It is very interesting to remind that eq. 10 holds approximately also in the 
case in which gF(t) is not exponentiaL In this case 
µF = averaee repair rate of the unit =··------ (I 1) 
The demonstration is 6iven in Appendix 7 
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5.4.3 Strategy 3: Functional subsystem consisting of two units, one working and 
the other in stand-by. Preventive maintenance. 
It is similar to strategy No. 2 with the difference that the working unit is 
also preventively replac0.d after having been used a period of tine "El,.,.''. 
,: 
He have 
( 12) 
where 
( 13) 
The following expression holds, only approdnately~ in the case that gF(t) is 
any arbitrary distribution 
(J 2 
;\'Cl 
F (14) =--,., llr;, 
" 
where 
crF is defined by eq. 14 
and µF is defined by eq. I I 
5.4.4 Strategy 4: Functional subsystem consisting of "np" units: 11kF11 of these 
units are working and the others "nF-kF" are in stand-by. No 
preventive maintenance. 
If o:1e of the workine units fails, it is automatically switched off, while the 
first of the stand-by units is at the same time automatically switched into 
operation. If a second unit fails, the second of the stand-by units comes into 
operation and so on. The failed units, after repair, are mounted again as stand-
by units. 
The subsystem fails if n!.?-kF+I units are failed. He have solved this case only 
with h.,.,(t) and eF(t) bein8 both exponential functions. We obtain 
.i.:' 
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(15) 
In the particular case kp=l (onty one unit working):. eq. 15 becomes 
(16) 
Since µF/crF is usually very large~ ue have also that eq. 15 can be written 
approximately 
µF 
(n -k ) F F 
In the case kp=t 1 eq. 17 becomes 
nF 
crF 
(17) 
(18) 
5 .4 .5 Strategy 5: Functional subsystem consisting of "np" units: "1r-p11 of these 
units are ·working and the others 11n -k II are in stand-by. Pre-F F 
ventive maintenance. 
It is similar to strategy No. 4 uith the difference that the uorking units are 
also preventively replaced after havins been used a period of time 11 0.,.,11 • 
:..• 
He have 
where crF and µFare given respectively by eqs. 11 and 14. 
For kF=l eq. 19 becomes 
(19) 
(20) 
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5.5 Jhe tedupttod end coupling coefficients and the average failure rate of a 
safety subsystem as function of the characteristics of its units 
The parameters of the safety subsystems have already been defined in para. 3, 
where they are given as function of the characteristics of the units which make 
the subsystems. Here we repeat only these expressions. The mathematical develop-
ments to obtain them are given in the Appendices 3 and 4. 
For the reduction coefficient "Ks" of a safety subsystem we have 
ms 
<ns> !(ps Ts) 
where 
KS= (1) (ms+))! (ns-ms> ! 
ns = number of the units which belong to the safety subsystem 
n 5 = number of the units which must fail in order to make the unit 
to fail (failure type "a") 
TS = checking period 
Ps = average failure rate (failure type "a11 ) of a unit and is given 
by eq. 4 of para. 2 
Fig. 3 shows qualitatively "ps" as function of 1108
11 and "Ts"· Figs. 4, 5 and 
6 shoi1 "K II as function of the narameter "p T " for different values of "m " s . s s s 
and 11n8
11
• To obtain a smaller value of "K8
11
1 one can think to reduce "Ts" 
(figs. 4~ 5 and 6). But if one reduces "Ts", 08 increases (fig. 3), which means 
that the units fail more often. The designer will be compelled to make a 
compromise between these two competinr effects. 
For the intercoupling coefficient "H" among 1111'1 safety subsystems, ue have 
N 
II (mSi +J) 
i=l 
HI'.' 1 S2 s·,1 = n 
.;, ' . ' ••• ' I: l~ 
1 + I: (msi> 
i=l 
(2) 
The failure rate ">.8
11 due to false trip (failure type "b") of a safety subsystem 
is given by 
(3) 
where 
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t
5 
= number of the units which must fail in order to make 
the unit to fail 
o,.. = average fa:.i.lure rate (failure type 11h11 ) of a unit and 
;:; 
is given by eq. 5 of para. 2 
µS == averae;e repair rate of a unit 
Fig. 3 shows qualitatively 11 0 8
11 as function of "es" and 1;1 5
11
• 
"µs" is given by the follow:.ns equation 
where 
r;,..(t)dt 
,,) 
g,,(t) = repo.ir probability <'1.ensity distribution for a unit. 
;:; 
Since µs/oe- is ust~ally very large, eq. 3 becomes 
' .., 
'n ~- n ) ' 
' C": NC • 
.:., :) 
For the safety subsystems the following relation may hold 
2, = n + s s - n S 
5.6 The annual shut clown cost "B11 
- . 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
The second term o: the annual loss function 11zii is 11B11 , which represents the 
expected annual cost: to repai.:- and to staX't the plant up after shut down. As 
we have done for the plan:: unavailability (para. 5. 2L we can also in this 
case associate to each bloc~ the corresponding annual cost for repair and 
start-up 
H 
D = L B. (1) 
j=l J 
where B. is the start-up cost related to block "j", and 1'T:1" is the nut:1ber of 
J 
the blocks. 
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If we indicate with 11Nj 11 
to block II j 11 , we have 
the number of shut do,m states which have been associated 
nj 
B = I: 
j i=) (2) 
where Bji is the annual shut down cost associated to shut down state 11ji". 
Finally if we indicate with "u j / the rate of occurrence of shut doi·m state 11j i 11 
and with ":3ji" the shut doi-m cost associated to shut do\m state 11ji"~ we have 
(3) 
Taking into account eqs. 2 and 3, eq. J becor.ies 
M rj (Dji ujij B = E E j =) i=l (4) 
5.7 The annual subsystems cost 11 C" 
As already done for the plant unavailability and the shut dm-m cost, we can write 
where 
C = 
M 
E Cj j=) 
Cj = annual cost of the subsystems belonging to block "j" 
M = number of the blocks 
(1) 
If we indicate with "C II the annual cost of the functional subsystem "ji" and Fji 
,,ith "C n that of the safety subsystem 11ji11 both belonging to block "f', we Sji 
have 
L. 
J 
C = E 
j i=J (2) 
where "Lj" and "Aj" are respectively the number of functional and safety sub-
systems belonging to block "_1 11 • 
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5.7.t Functional Subsystems 
The annual cost of a functional subsystem is given by 
where 
(3) 
EFji = annual capital cost of subsystem 11rji 11 • This cost includes 
the design~ construction and installation costs divided by 
the number of years during ,1hich the plant is expected to be 
in operation. The annual interests of the invested capital 
must be also included. 
VFji = annual operatins cost of subsystem 11Fj/ 
Y,., •• = annual maintenance cost of subsystem 11Fji 11 
~ J 1. 
Now we shall express the costs EFji' VFji and YI'ji as functions of the costs of 
the units which belong to the subsystem "Fj/· 
For the sake of simplicity~ let us drop the subscrirt nji 11 • 
We have 
and 
E,., = nF 
,! 
• e Ii' 
VF = k v' + (nF-kF)v~ F F 
1· 
Y,., 
""F [x y' + y" J =-~ 0 F F Ti' F 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
nF = total number of units belonging to the functional subsystem 
e,., = annual capital cost of a unit 
.0 
k ..... = number of the uorkin0 units 
!:: 
v; = annual operating cost of a working unit 
vF = annual operatin3 cost of a stand-by unit 
0F = maintenance period (years) 
y~ = cost of a non preventive replacement (or repair) 
Yi= cost of a rreventive replacement (or repair) 
~=expected nurnber of non preventive replacements in the time 
interval 11 0 .. / 1 • j_l 
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11xF" is given by the following equation which has been obtained in Appendix 8 
(7) 
where 
L-l indicates antitransfonnation from the Laplace to the time domain 
"*" indicates Laplace transformation 
s = complex variable of the Laplace domain 
* hF(s) = Laplace transform of h(t) 
hF(t) = failure probability density distd..budon of a unit 
5.7.2 Safety Subsystems 
The annual cost of a safety subsystem is given by 
where 
ESj i = annual capital cost of subsystem "S j / 
This cost includes the design, construction 
and installation costs divided by the number 
of years during uhich the plant is expected 
to be in operation. The annual interests of 
the invested capital must be also included 
VSji = annual operating cost of subsystem "Sji" 
Y = annual maintenance cost of subsystem "SJ" i" 
Sji 
(3) 
How we shall express the costs ES"i) v8 .i and Yc.i as functions of the costs of J J c.:,J 
the units which belong to the subsystem 11Sji11 • 
Also here, for the sake of simplicity" ue drop the subscript "jiH. 
He have 
(9) 
(10) 
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ns -- l 
y - IX ' + y" s - e I sYs s, 
s J (11) 
where 
ns = total number of the units which b~long to the safety subsystem 
es = annual capital cost of a unit 
vs = annual operating cost of a unit 
0 s = maintenance period 
y' = cost of a non preventive replacement (or repair) s 
y" = cost of a preventive replacement s 
x8 = expected number of non preventive replacements in the time 
interval "es"· 
"xs" is given by the following equation which has been obtained in Appendix 9 
(12) 
where 
TS = checking period 
-· -h8(s,Ts) = Laplace transform of h8(t,T8
) 
h8(t,T8) is the total failure probability density distribution and is given 
by the following equation 
(J 3) 
where 
h5<t> = failure probability density distribution (failure type "a") 
h"(t) = failure probability density distribution (failure type "b ") s 
o' = const. s 
0 II 
s = const. 
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6. The rate of occurrence 11u/ of a "disaster" as function of the characteristics 
of the units of the plant 
The rate of occurrence "u/ of a disaster (big accident) is obtained by summing 
the rates of occurrence of all the minimal paths to co from ;;normal operation" 
(state O) to the 11disaster state" (fig. 11) 
where 
N 
ud 1:: I: u di 
i=l 
udi = rate of occurrence associated to the minimal path 11i 11 
N = number of the minimal paths 
(1) 
Strictly speaking, eq. l is valid only approximately. One should really sum the 
probabilities of all the mutually exclusive events 1 which bring to the 11disaster 
state" 9 to get the total probability 11~/. 
From this total probability one should calculate ud 
(2) 
However, since Qd is e2~tremely small, one does not make any appreciable error if 
one instead uses the more simple eq. 1. 
As do·,,e for the plant unavailability, here too we shall illustrate the calculation 
of the rate of occurrence "u d" for the particular case of the scheme shmm in 
fig. 13. He shall suppose that only the subsystems F2I, F22~ F23~ St 1, S12, S13~ 
S14, SIS, S21, S22j S23 can fail. 
The "Disaster Tree", with all the minimal paths to go from the initial events 
to the "Disaster State 11 , is sho~m in fig. 21 • T,Je have also supposed that the 
feedback from subsystem "St 511 to (IS22" is 100 % reliable. From the analysis 
of this tree, one realizes that some subsystems are required to fail and some 
other safety subsystems are instead required to function. 
At the time of the failure of a functional subsystem, the probability that a 
safety subsystem (related to it) has not failed is much higher than the proba-
bility that it has already failed. 'Je shall not make therefore any appreciable 
error :i.n the evaluation of the failure rate of a minimal path 1 if <:,Je shall surposc 
that the safety subsystem, ,:,7hich is required to function, has probability equal 
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to I to function. Fig. 22 shows all the minimal paths: only the subsystems which 
are required to fail have been included. 
From fig. 22 we get 
where "udi" is the rate of occurrence of the minimal path "i". 
From fig. 22 we obtain also 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(C) 
(9) 
(10) 
(I 1) 
(12) 
(t 3) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
- .s 1 -
(17) 
whete the reduction factors and the coupling coefficients of the safety subsystems 
have been indicated respectively uith "Ks" and nu", and the failure rates of the 
various subsystems have been indicated with ").n. The equations to calculate the 
"K" and "H" coefficients are given in the paragraphs 2 and 5.5. s 
The equations for the failure rates of the functional and safety subsystems are 
given respectively in paragraphs 5.4 and 5,5. 
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7. Final considerations on the anhual loss function "Z" 
In the preceeding paragraphs we have shorm how to express the annual loss "Z" 
as function of the characteristics of the un::ts of the plant. 
The designer can choose each unit among the different types available on the 
market. The best constellation of choices will be that ,thich gives the minimum 
value of "Z" and at the same time satisfies the constraint that the rate of 
occurrence 1'ud" of a disaster is smaller than the value nu 11 fixed by the 
max 
safety committee. 
To develop in details a mathematical method to find the minit'.lum of 11Z" is a task 
which needs to be solved, but Hhich exceeds the limits of our report. 
TJe shall make here only some considerations on a particular procedure, which 
seems to us at the moment to be very convenient. 
We shall indicate with [u/{I-U)]Fji the quantity U/{I-U) calculated by putting 
in it equal to zero the failure rates and reduction coefficients of all the 
safety subsystems and the failure rates of all the functional subsystems with 
the exception of the functional subsystem "Fji 11 • 
He shall indicate with [u/{l-U)] 5ji the quantity U/{1-U) calculated by putting 
in it equal to zero the failure rates and reduction coefficients of all the 
safety subsystems with the exception of the safety subsystem uSji". To calculate 
U/{1-U) 5 .. one needs therefore to know also the failure rates of the functional J1 
subsystems, which are multiplied by 1':.Sj i. 
In the same way for the annual shut dot-m costs "B", we define the two quantities 
"BFj in and "Bsj 1". 
He can now define the functional partial annual loss functions "Z 11 Fji 
ZFji = (J-sp)(J-U) G~u]Fji PTY + nFji + CFji 
where "sp11 is the overlappine coefficient. 
(1) 
For example, in the case of the functional subsystem P21 {oil pumps subsystem 
in fi~. 13L l'1e have 
" 
= {1-s ){I-U) PTY o/F21 + ~21 "F21 + CF21 
I' 21 
He can also define the safety !)artial annual loss function "Z " Sji 
{2) 
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(3) 
For example» in the case of the safety subsystem S21 (oil pressure measuring 
channels in fig. 13), we have 
zs21 • ( 1-s ) (1-u) PTy F·r21 +\,22 K + A s21j + 
P [ 'I' 24 821 'I' 25 
(4) 
We shall say that a safety partial annual loss function "Z " is related to a 
Sji 
functional partial annual loss function "ZFxn" if "ZSji" contains the failure 
rate of the functional subsystem "Fxn". For instance "z
521
" (eq. 4) is related 
to "zF21 " (eq. 2) because it contains AF21 • 
For the functional and safety subsystems, which belong to the block "m" having 
the maximum unavailability, we shall instead write 
and 
ZFmi = ( 1-U) PTy b ~U ]Fmi + BFmi + CFmi 
ZSm1 • (1-U) PTy ~~ti]Sm1 + BSmi + CSmi 
Takine into account eq. 8 of para. 5.3~ we can write 
where 
u = (t-s )(J-U) l I: { <1~u> + E <1~u> + JU [L. Aj J} p j=l i=l Fj i i=l Sj j;m 
+ (1-U) rL~ 
Li=] 
U = plant unavailability 
s = overlapping factor p 
U = number of blocks 
A 
m 
+ E 
i=J <1~u> J Smi 
Lj = number of functional subsystems belongin~ to block "j" 
Aj = number of safety subsystems belonging to block "j" 
and ''m" indicates the block having the maximum unavailability. 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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Taking into account eq. 7, one can easily prove that 
H [Lj Aj J 
Z = E E ZF'i + E Z~·· j=l i=l J i=t ,:Ji 
(8) 
where all the 
by eqs. 5 and 
ZFji and ZSji are given respectively by eqs. 1 and 3 for Hm and 
6 for j"'l'!l. 
The procedure to find out the min:i.mum of the annual loss function can be now 
described. It consists of the following steps: 
Step Uo. 1 From previous operatine experience we know already what is the 
block having the maxL'llum unaveilability 11U ". He know also the 
m 
value of the overlapping coefficient 11s ". 
!) 
Tfo assume for the plant unavailability an initial value "U " in 
coming from previous operating experience (for instance Uin=O.t). 
We use this value 11Uin11 in the functional partial annual loss 
functions "ZFj/ defined by eqs. 1 and 5. He find the type of 
unit, the strategy and the maintenance period of subsystem "Fji", 
which give the minimum of "ZFj/· 
For each subsystem "Fjic, ue get the optimum failure rate AFji 
b hi h 11Z H h ~h . . Y w c Fji as 1. e n1n1rmm. 
Step No. 2 Ue use the values A;ji in the safety partial loss functions "Zsji" 
defined by eqs. 3 and 6. He find the type of unit:- the maintenance 
period, the checking period, the total number of units and the type 
of structure of subsystem Sji' which give the minimum of 11z5j 1". 
It is important to notice that the constraint 
must be also satisfied. 
\)d < \) 
max 
For each subsyste".!l 11 S II we get the optimum values of the reduction ji 
coefficient aK' " and of the failure rate 11 \' 11 by i1hich "Z " Sji Sji Sji 
has the minimum. 
Step Ho. 3 We use the values "~j i ~ "~j i and r:~j i to calculate the plant unavaila-
bility (eq. 7). 
~,Je r;et the value U' which may be different from "Uin". 
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-~tep No. 4 We repeat the steps I 9 2 and 3 until the values of U converge to 
a final value. 
In this way we have found separately the minimals of all the partial annual loss 
functions "ZFji" and "ZSji". We get the ninimum of 11211 by using eq. 8. 
This procedure is valid only if the "ZSji" are one or more orders of magnitude 
smaller than the related "Z II when they are near to their minimals. That is Fnx ' 
(9) 
This should be normally the case (see numerical example of para, 4), because 
a safety subsystem has usually a very low value of the reduction coefficient 
-5 
"Ks" (<10 ) and a subsystem annual cost "Cs" much smaller than that of each of 
the functional subsystems which are related to it. 
If th• conditions "9" are not satisfied, one has to group together all the ZSji 
and Z~ which are related. ~ nx 
The minimUttl of each group can then be found, taking also into account that the 
constraint (ud < u ) must be also satisfied. The mathematical procedure would max 
be in this case much more complicated. 
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8. A more general approach to the evaluation of the safety requirements of a 
power plant. 
In the model described in the preceeding paragraphs we have made the followine 
two hypothesis for the evaluation of the disaster failure rate 
(i) It is possible to go to the "Disaster" state only from the 
"Normal Operation" state. 
(ii) A disaster is always caused by combined failures of functional 
and safety subsystems. 
These two assumptions may not always be valid. A typical example is that of the 
''meltdmm accident of a dry and subcritical core due to fission product heat" 
in the case of Sodium cooled fast reactors (Bfol. B16). This would be a case, 
in which the failure of a functional subsystem (i.e. the vessel subsystem ,,hich 
contains Sodium and core) would lead directly to a disaster. 
For this reason a still more general model can be developed (fig. 27). Fe have 
now "n" shut down states, and from "n" of these it is possible to go to the 
disaster state. Each disaster failure rate 1\\in will be given by 
where 
(1) 
udi = rate of occurrence of a disaster caused by combined failures 
of functional and safety subsystems, starting from state "i". 
AFSi= rate of occurrence of a disaster due to accidents which are 
either not detectable or not controllable with the safety 
system~ start ins from state 11 i 11 • 
For the calculation of "ud. 11 one can use the nrocedure shown in nara. 6. l • L 
For the calculation of 11 AFSi11 , one has to sum the failure rates of all the 
functional subsystems characterized by failures 1 which bring the plant in a 
dangerous situation if the plant is in state 111 11 'J and which are either not 
detectable or not controllable with the safety system. 
He shall indicate ·with "C\" the probability that the plant is in state 11i 11 
at time "t". 
Lookin; at fig. 27, we can write the following equations 
dO [ n ·o 
-=-Q I: u + 
dt o i=) 1 
dQI 
--= + dt 
d~ 
-= dt 
n 
I: 
i=o 
dO 
"'n+J 
=Q u -'¥ 0 
o n+I n+I n+I dt 
N 
E \ + QD = I 
i=o 
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{2) 
(3) 
{4) 
{5) 
(6) 
(7) 
{8) 
We have "H+3" equations with "N+2 11 unknowns. Only "N+2" equations will be in-
dependent. The last one can be obtained by surmning the first "U+2 11 equations. 
According to what we have said in para. 3 and para. 5.2, also here we have that 
the following property is satisfied 
{9) 
Taking into account the expression 9, the approximate solution for "O." is 
1 given by 
uhere 
and 
{ 10) 
"S/ is the solution obtained from the first n+J equations (eqs. 2 
to 6) by putting all the "u II equal to zero 
ti 
{ I I) 
The functions "S/ are characterized. by asymptotic values 1\co which are reached 
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in a very short period of time 
where 
S = S (oo) ioo i 
'\ 
~-s 
'¥ ooo 1 
1 s =-_....,...._..._ 
ooo N u i. 
1 + I: --" 
i=l '*'1 
( i=l, 2, ••• N) 
Note that S was indicated in the previous parap,raphs with A
00
• ooo 
The initial values "S10" are 
and 
(i=l,2)) ••• ,11) 
Taking into account eqs. 10 and 11, from eq. 7 we get 
The occurrence rate "un" of a disaster will be 
n 
i~o\)ti8iooexp(-uti t) 
n 
I: ~ exp(-u t) 
"ioo ti 
i=o 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
If we indicate uith "FSji" a functional subsystem whose failure startinr from 
plant state "i" is not controllable (or detectable) with the safety systemil 
we can write 
j:.Di 
AFSi = .E AFSji 
J=l 
(18) 
where "Di" is the total number of the functional subsystems characterized by 
failures which lead directly to a disaster if the plant is in state "i". In 
eq. 18 "A "is the failure rate of the functional subsystem "FSji". FSji 
rre can associate to each subsystem 11FSj i" its partial annual cost function "ZFSj /. 
Each of the "ZFsj/ will be a decreasing function uith 11 AFsj/. 
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The total annual cost "ZFS11 of these particular functional subsystems will be 
n 
E 
i=l ~t ZySji] (19) 
In order to reduce the dan3erous effects due to a nuclear explosion (disaster)~ 
th~ taactor may be provided ~,ith a containment syst~m capable of absorbing the 
explosive energy due to a bir, accident, once that this has taken plate. Task 
of the containment system is also to avoid the spreadin~ of the radioactive 
products in the surrounding atmosphere. 
It is becoming more and more clear that there is not only one bie accident, but 
a spectrum of possible big accidents. To each accident one can associate the 
correspondent develor:,able explosive mechanical energy "H", so that a probability 
density distribution of "W" will describe the spectrum of accidents. 
We ask now for the probability, I( , that the containment system will fail to 
C 
absorb the explosive energy without rupture. For the sake of simplicity we shall 
limit ourselves to consider only the shock wave effect. We shall imagine that 
the containment system is just a cylinder as sho~m in fig. 23 A. Fig. 23 B shows 
the same cylinder deformed after the explosion has taken place. 
The explosive energy will produce the hiehest stresses at the mid plane of the 
cylinder (Bibl. B18). These stresses have a probability distribution, fs, (curve 
I of fig. 24) about the mean value, ns' with a standard deviation, Cs· 
On the other side the strength of the material has also a probability distribution, 
$t' (curve 2 of fig. 24) about the mean value nt with a standard deviation tt• 
The two curves of fig. 24 may overlap and the amount of overlapping gives an 
indication of how large the probability "Kc" is, that during the explosion the 
stress becomes larger than the strensth. 
The probability, p, that the strength nt is lareer than a fixed value n
5 
is given 
by (fi8. 24) 
(20) 
The probability, 1-K , that the strength is larger than the stress is the following 
C 
1-Kc = ~~-~ ~8 (n8 ) ~::nt.Cnt)dnt] dn8 (21) 
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If we assume that both <1> 9 and <l>t are normal distributions, it can be shown that 
eq. 21 becomes 
<
--) n -n 1-K = <I>, t s 
c Ns /r;~ + r;; 
where <l>us is the cumulative standardized normal distribution. 
Eq. 22 can also be written as follows 
From eq. 23, at each value of K, it corresponds a value of 
C 
n - n t s 
/r;2 + r;2 
t s 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
For given values of r;t, r;s and ns~ we get the value of nt/ns' which is directly 
related to the wall thickness of the cylinder. 
This procedure may lead to a rational evaluation of the safety factor nt/ns 
and may avoid to overdesign the safety containment system. 
The smaller is "K/, the higher nt/\ will be, and the hi3her the thickness of 
the safety container will be. We can conclude that the smaller is "K ". the C . 
higher the annual cost "Z "of the container will be. 
C 
The probability of the event that a disaster takes place and that the safety 
container does not cope with the explosion is given by 
(25) 
with uD e:iven by eq. 17. 
low the constraint given by the safety committee can be written as follows 
K u0 < u c max (26) 
The total annual loss function will be ~iven by 
(27) 
where 
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Z = annual loss function as defined in para. 7 
ZFs= partial annual loss function given by eq. 19 
Z = partial annual loss function associated to the reactor C 
containment system 
The problem has now became that of finding the minimun of the function "Zt" 
(eq. 27) with the constraint defined by the expression 26. 
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9. AP,pen;.'llx li Calculation of the average failure rate of a unit belongipg to 
a functional subsystem 
A. 1.1 Introduction 
The subject of this appendix is to calculate the average failure 
rate" C5F" of a unit belonging to a functional subsystem. 
We introduce the following symbols: 
"~(t)" == failure probability density distribution of the unit 
11 t" = time 
II e II 
F = maintenance period, that is time between two preventive replacements 
The average failure rate "o '' (defined as reciprocal to the meantime F 
to failure) is given by 
1 
OF= meantime between two failures :::: 
Q 
£ F ~(t)dt 
= _Fi_r_, . .._l--1.,,..·F-h_-(-t-)d_t_/_+_J.,,.~-F-tiL-( t-)-dt 
F - o -~ - o --F 
(1) 
Eq. 1 is derived in thefollowing paragraph (A 1.2) 
A 1.2 Calculation of "C5p" 
A unit is characterized by its reliability "RI;,, where 
~ = P f unit is not failed at time "t" ~ (2) 
Evaluating "~(t)" for the first maintenance period we get, 
with 11 hF( t)", 
.GF 
RF( 9 F) == 1 - ~ hF (t)dt (3) 
- 63 -
For the interval ["o;q • Q~, i.e. for "q" rnainumance periods, 
we get, taking into account eq. 3, 
J~ q RF (q • 9F) = £1- ~(t)dt J 0 
where q = 1,2, .... 
We can write t = q 'gF + [ 
Taking into account eqs 4 and 6, we get 
[ 
["1- j ~(t)dt J 
0 
The average failure rate "op"• can be written as follows 
d = 1 
F 
where RF(t) is the reliability of the unit 
The integral from "o" to "eo II of the function 11 ~ ( t) 11 can be 
represented as a sum, i.e. 
Oo 
(4) 
(5) 
(7) 
(8) 
Jl\,(t)dt = 
0 
g q g t 
Ll- J F~(t)dt J j F L-1-/ ~(t)dt Jdt 
0 0 0 
(9) 
By partial integration, we get 
(lo) 
Taking into account 10, we get from 9 
J~ (t)dt " l F ·fF- L 9F j9F~dt - j 9Ft~dtJ (11) 
o 1- £1- J ~dtJ o O 
0 
Putting 11 into 8, we get finally 
Q 
QF Ll- J F~(t)dt_7 + (12) 
0 
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JO. Appendix 2~ Calculation of the two average failure rates of a unit belonging 
to a safety subsystem. 
The average failure rates 11 p '' and 11 cr II of a unit belonginp to a safety subsystem s s 
will be calculated in this Appendix. They are obtained in a way very similar to 
that used to evaluate the failure rate of a unit belonging to a functional sub-
system. There are however two important distinctions to be made. 
(i) It has to be taken into account that there are tuo types of failures: 
a) Failure type 21 a" (when a safety unit does not function when it should) 
b) Failure type "b11 (when a safety unit functions w:ien it should not). 
(ii) The increased failure rate~ caused by "on-off-cyclin~ 11 (due to the 
periodical testing of the u::iits) has to be taken into account. 
Let us indicate with h8(t) a'!"l.d h5(t) the tuo failure probability density distri-
butions of a unit respecti·1ely for failure type "a11 and failure type "b". 
The on-off-cycling has practically the effect to change the time scale of the two 
failure probability cumulative distributions. 
The coefficients by which the time scale is changed are 
for failure type 11an 
and 
for failure type 11h11 
with 08' and o" being two constants. s 
( 1) 
(2) 
Introducing these tuo coefficients, the tvro new failure probability density distri-
butions, which take into account the cycling effect~ will be respectively 
(failure t,1.,e 11a") 
,I • (3) 
and 
( o') { 011 l + ~ h" t(l + 2.) ~ (faHure type 11h11 ) 1
s 's J (4) 
The total failure probability density distribution 11h (t)" will be given by s 
- 65 -
J+ 2) hJ t(l+ 2) I - (J+ S) h" t(I+ 2-) dt + f o' { 0'}] f 011 lt { 011 } J T~ - TS Tc T~ i:) .:, ..., 0 
+ L°+ ,:) h$ t(I+ ,:) c(I+ -,;) 
0 
h' { t(I+ ,:) dt (5) [ 
011 
{ o" }J [ o, lt o' } J 
With a procedure similar to that used in Appendix I ~ we can calculate the total 
unit failure rate "p +cr " where "p II is the failure rate for failure type "a" s s s 
and 
11
0 5
11 
is that for failure type "b". 
where 
08 = maintenance period of a unit 
We can write also the following equations 
PS 
Ps+crs 
and 
Ps+0s 
j el o• o• ,[J 0 L (I+ ,;) hS {t(I+ T:1 
=....:;;. ______ .,..._ ________________ _ 
1°\g(t)dt 
= 
Taking into account eq. 6, eqs. 7 and 8 become finally 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
a = s 
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11.Appendix 3: Calculation of the reduction and coupling coefficients for 
safety subsystems 
A 3,1 The reduction1 coefficient "K811 of a safety subsystem 
Let us suppose we have a safety subsystem "s", which is related to the 
functional subsystem 1'F". This means that when "F11 fails, 11S11 (if n6t 
already failed) will contribute to shut the plant down. 
We shall indicate with"~ the average failure rate of the functional 
subsystem "F". 
The safety subsys tern "S II is made of "ng" units connected in such a way 
that, if at the time at which "F" fails 11 k II out of the "n 11 units s s 
have not already failed (failure type "a"), "S" will operate correctly. 
We remind here briefly (see para. 2) that the units of a safety sub-
system can have two types of failures: 
(i) 
{ii) 
failure type "a". It occurs when the unit does not 
operate when it is required to operate 
fO.ilur 9 type "b". It occurs when the unit does operate 
when it is not asked to operate. 
In this appendix we shall deal with failure type "a" only. 
Going back to our subsystem "s", we can easily see that 11 S11 will fail 
if (1) 
units fail. 
To find out that .a unit is failed with failure type "a", it is neces-
sary to test it from time to time. We shall indicate with"~" the 
checking period, that is the time interval between two checks (tests). 
We ask now for the probability "PsF(t)" of the event that, at the time 
11 t 11 at which "F" fails, 11 S11 has already failed. We indicate with "a 11 SF 
the probability that this event occurs in the time interval 111311 between 
two checks. The probability "PsF (q~)", that the event occurs during 
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the first 11 q11 checking intervals, is 
PSF (q1) " "sF f 1 - PSF ['<s(q-l~f + PsF["lii(q-l)J (2) 
...., 
Applying eq. 2 r~eatedly, we get 
Eq. 3 is valid only when II q11 is an entire nu.nber. 
We can write approximately 
t 
q ::: 
'"ls 
Taking into account eq. 4, eq. 3 becomes 
-Yt 
e 
where 
y::: -
'Z' s 
Since ~SF 1, we get finally from eq. 5 
'Z's 
"<nihas been calculated in paragraph A 3.2 (eq.17). We have 
where 
J's = average failure rate of a unit for failure 
type II a" defined by eq. 4 of para. 3 
Taking into account eq. 12, eq. 11 becomes 
where 
11 K II is called reduction coefficient. 
s 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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Figs. 4; 5 and 6 show "Ks" as function of "..Ps~"for different values 
of "ns" and "ms". 
A 3.2 Calculation of the probabili ty"a:s/. 
We want here to calculate the probability "%; of the event that the 
safety subsystem 118 11 fails before the functional subsystem "F" in the 
time interval 1'~ 11 • 
The reliability "R II of "s", that is, the probability that "S" is s 
not yet failed at time "t", is given by 
ns (:) i (n8 -i) RS = I: RS (1-R8 ) (1) i=k s 
where 
RS = reliability of a unit. 
The probability "F:s" that "s" is already failed at "t" is 
ns (ns \ i (ns-i) 
F8 = l-R8 = i:m , i 'j ~ (1-H8 ) (2) 
s 
where 
(3) 
If "F II is the failure cumulative probability distribution of the F 
functional subsystem "F", we get 
(4) 
We have 
(5) 
and 
= exp (-{ t) (6) 
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From eqs. 5 and 6 we obtain 
dF = - in 7 Yi 
F - S -
(7) 
From eq. 1 we get 
dRS = 
( Ds} ! (8) 
Taking into account eqs.) and 7, eq. 4 becomes 
+ l l (m8+1)[ l (n8-m8-1) H8(~) • 1-%(~) + .... -
(10) 
Taking into account eq.6, eq.10 finally becomes 
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Where 'T" stands for the 11r'-function•1 
If 
"i., ("< 5 • 10-2 
.!s 
eq. 11 can be simplified to 
(11) 
(12) 
[ J (m3+1)- J (n -m +1) ~(Zg) 1-H,g(~) S S 
- (13) 
If we have 
J' -2 s't's < 10 (14) 
we ean write 
(15) 
and 
(16) 
Taking into account eqs. 15 and 16, eq. 13 can be still simplified 
(17) 
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A 3,3 Ca1,p\l~ation of the coupling coefficient 
Let us suppose that we have two safety subsystems 11Sl" and "S2". We 
want to calculate the probability "ex" that both fail before the 
functional subsystem "F" in the time interval "'2"'8" . 
The cumulative probability distribution "F S1; 82 
11 
,that both 
Sl and S2 fail in a small time interval "t" is given by 
(1) 
The failure cumulative probability distribution "Fi of the functional 
subsystem "F" is 
The probability "ex", that both "Sl 11 and "S2" fail before "F" in the 
small time interval "'?! 11 , is 
(2) 
-S m m 
_ f t=?:s _ \, (°sl) ! (°s2) ! (.l'Sl 7ij) Sl (J'S2 'ls) 32 ~ 
ex - t==o FSl;S2 dFF- (ms1+ms2tl)(ms1)!(ns1-m~n)!(!Ils2J(ns2-ms2)! 
Eq.3 can be written as follows 
where 
and 
ex = 
-
rz:;s 
H = 31,S2 
(mSl +l) (ms2+1) 
(mSl +mS2+l) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(3) 
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~l;S2 is called coupling coefficient 
For "N" safety subsystems we have 
N 
·rr 
i=l H = Sl;S2 •. ,,;SN 
1 + (8) 
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12. Appendix 4: Calculation of the average failure rate of a safety subsystem 
Let us suppose that we have a safety subsystem 11S" made of 11n5
11 units so connected 
that 1 if 11 28
11 out of the "n8
11 units fail with the failure type 11b11 1 the sub-
system "S" fails (false trip). 
He introduce the following symbols 
0 8 = average failure rate of a unit defined by eq. 5 of para. 2 
µS = average repair rate of a unit, that is reciprocal of the mean 
time to repair. 
If g5(t) is the repair probability density distribution of a unit, we have 
(1) 
The safety subsystem can be at time 11t 11 in one of the following states (fi~. 25) • 
.•. 
Number of Number of 
5tate working failed Comments 
units units 
0 ns 0 
1 n -J s 1 
2 n -2 s 2 
. . . . . . . . 
i n -i s i 
. . . . . . . . 
51, -2 s ns-is+2 Q, -2 s 
JI, -1 s ns-.Q,s+I Q, -1 s 
is ~ns-ts ~ is Subsystem failed 
Let us indicate with Q1(t) the probability that the subsystem us" is in state 
He can write the following 11 i +1" equations s 
(2) 
".; ii 
... . 
Since 
E Qi =I 
i=o 
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only "£5" of the 
11
.Q.8+1" equations are independent. 
The associated initial conditions are 
Q (0) = J 
0 
and 
Q/0) = 0 (i=t, 2, ..• ,, 2
8
) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(61 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Taking into account the initial conaitions 8 and 9, the Laplace transforms 
the eqs. 2 to 6 are 
* * 
-J = -(n cr +s)Q + µ
8
q
1 S S 0 
. . 
( ) * n* 0 = n~-28+1 cr~Qn -I - s~n 
" ... "'s "'s 
(lo) 
(JI) 
(J 2) 
( J 3) 
(14) 
where 
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s = complex variable of the Lapla~e domain 
"*" indicates Laplace transform 
The Laplace transform of the reliability "Rs" of the subsystem 11S11 is ~iven by 
(15) 
Taking into account eq. 14, eq. 15 becomes 
Now we have 
where 
( 16) 
(17) 
6 = determinant of the coefficients of the first 112" s 
equations (eq. 14 excluded) 
A10 = determinant complementary to the element "a 
11 
Ns 12s 
(1 st line and "i/'th column) of the determinant 6 
w 
The determinant 11 1:!.a, having "JI, 11 lines and "JI," columns, is uritten below (eq. 18) s s 
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.-, 
Cl) 
+ 
Cl.) 
;:l. 
+ 
t/) 
0 
-0 0 0 0 U'.l ;:l. + U) 
~ 
I 
C/l 
i:: 
-l---1 
I 
.-, 
Cl) 
+ C/l 
;:l. U) 
+ 0 U) 
-0 N 
0 0 0 U'.l 
-
+ 
;:l. N U) 
+ ~ C/l I 
~ U) 
I i:: 
U) 
-i:: 
'--' 
L-.....1 
I 
U) 
0 
-C"'l 
+ 
0 0 0 
U) 0 
~ 
I 
U) 
i:: 
'-J 
C/l 
0 0 ;:l. 0 0 
i-, 
Cl) 
+ U) 
;:l. U'.l 
+ 0 
C/l 
-0 U) 0 N . 0 0 
;:l. 
-
I 
N (/) 
I i:: 
U) '-J 
i:: 
'-J 
L-...1 
I 
.-, 
Cl) 
+ C/l 
;:l. 
+ (/) U) 
0 0 
U) 
- -;1 .,-1 
I I 0 0 0 
U) C/l 
i:: i:: 
'--' '-J 
L-...1 
I 
-Cl) 
+ U) C/l 0 
0 U) 0 0 0 0 
C/l i:: 
i:: 
'-J 
I 
II 
<I 
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Taking into account eq. 17, eq. 16 becomes 
6 - (nc:--.R."+J)oSAI ~ 
., ,, "'s 
st. 
On the other hand "R*" is also given by 
s 
By solving the system of eqs. 10 to 13~ we get 
A 
Q* = (-1 ) i . ..!!. i 6 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
where 11611 is the determinant defined by eq. 18 and "Au" is the determinant 
complementary to the element "a "(1st line and "i"th column) of Ii. Ii 
Putting 21 in 201 we obtain 
JI, -1 s 
(-J)i E Ali 
R* i=J = s 
6 
By comparing eqs. 22 and 19, we cet 
t. - <ns-is+J)osAus Sls-1 i 
-------- = E (-1) A 
i=I 1i s 
By extracting the determinant "A "from 6 (eq. JS), one obtains 
u<'.' 
.) 
Putting 24 in 23 for s=o, one eets 
[ti] s=o 
The average failure rate "As" of subsystem "S" is eiven by 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
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(26) 
Taking into account eqs. 22 and 25, we get 
(27) 
By extracting the determinants "Au" from t:. (eq. 18) ~ we obtain for s=o 
AU - (-J) 0 8 - (n -.Q. )! (nS-i)! OS + t J _ (R.s-i) (i-1) n8(n5-t)(n. s-2) ••• (n5-i+2) t (Jl.5-i) s=o S S 
(i5-1-1) (2 -1-1) (i -i)J 
s ) s + (ns-i-J)!os µs + ••. +{ns-is+J)!osµs +(ns-2s !µs 
Taking into account eqs. 28, eq. 27 becomes 
OS 
As =-2; ___ 1_fµ_s_t_2_i_-i---1~(-n~-f_;-~1:--i~-~f~)-_r ___ J_ 
i=o LoSJf=o (ns-f)! 
Introducing the index 
q = n -f s 
we get finally 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
Since in the practical case µ5/o8 is very large~ eq. 31 can be approximately 
written as folloi,s 
(32) 
(28) 
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The calculation of 11 A,./' developed in this Appendix is sttictly rigbrous only in 
;:; 
the case in i.1hich the failure ~nd the repair probability distributions are both 
exponential. However, due to the conclusions reached in Appendix 6, the result 
is still valid for any type of distribution if "as" and 11µ 8
11 
are average values 
defined respectively by eq. 5 of para. 2 and eq. 1 of this appendix. 
- 81 -
13, Appendix 5: Calculation of the point-availability for a simple plant model 
' 
The solution of eqs. (6), (7), (8) of para.3 will be obtained in this 
appendix (see also fig. 7). We have three linear differential equations 
with constant coefficientsi 
dQ 
0 
-
= (1) 
dt 
dQl 
= __._ 
dt 
dQ2 
= dt 
Where Q == probability that the plant is in state "o" 
0 
Ql == probability that the plant is in state "1" 
Q2 ::; probability that the plant is in state II 2" 
~ = rate of occurrence of the event that the functional 
~ystem fails 
KS== reduction factor of the safety system 
(2) 
(3) 
K /\=rate of occurrence of a "disaster" i.e. of the event S F 
1hit the functional system fails and the safety system 
has already failed before 
AS== rate of occurrence of a false trip 
'}' = repair rate, i.e. reciprocal to the meantime to repair the 
plant 
For Q
0
, Q1, Q2 the following relation holds 
1 ( 4) 
Therefore only 2 of the 3 eqs. 1, 2, 3 are independent. The initial 
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conditions are 
They mean that at time t = 0 the probability that the plant is in 
state "o" is equal to 1. 
Applying the Laplace transform to eqs. (1), (2) we get 
0 = 
Where "s" is the complex variable in the Laplace domain and the 
asterisk 11 .:#::11 denotes the Laplace transform. 
We get with Cramer's rule from the system 
(6), (7) for Q* 0 
-1 f I 
Q*= 
0 - (s+ 1;1) 
::: 
0 
- ( s+/\. +/\. +K "- ) -
't' F S SF 
(/\, F+"-s) -- j - (s+ 't') 
s+ Y 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
To antitrasform eq.8 to the time domain, the roots of the characteristic 
equation must be found. 
(9) 
The two roots are 
(lo) 
s = -1 ;2 2 
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For practical ca~es; the 'rate :of- occurrence of a big accident 11K8~
11 
is very small compared to the sum of the two failure-rates ""F" and, · 
"~s". They are again small compared to' the repair rate 11"/11 • The folitiw-
ing relation therefore holds: 
This is discussed in more details in para. 3, 
With 11 we get also the relation 
.. (~+;>..s-Ks • ~F+ 'f')2 
4 
Taking into account the expressions 11 and 12, we get from eq. 10 
and 
s ";t 
2 
The antitrasform to the time domain of eq. 8 is 
Q (t):: 
0 
)' + S2 
s .a 2 .i 
Taking into account eqs. 13 and 14, eq. 15 becomes 
t) 
... 
exp (s2t) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
Q (t) ~ 
0 
+ exp [t(}.. F+;..8 +'i'~ exp(-K8;>..Ft) 
(16) 
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14. Append~x,6; Calculation of the point-availability with any type of failure-
and repai~-probability-density-distributions 
A.6.1 Introduction 
The point-availability "A II of the plant ( and likewise f'ot a. sub-
system or a unit) is defined as the,,probability that the plant 
(and likewise, the subsystem and the unit) is up at time "t": 
A(t) = P f plant is up at "t" t (1) 
In the following treatment we shall suppose that all the failures 
are repairable which, is equivalent to say that no "absorbing state" 
exists. 
A 6.2 Calculation of the Availability "A" 
The availability "A(t)" is given by the following expression 
where 
"f-.; (s)" 
"f(t)" 
"w *"(s)" 
"w (t)" 
II s" 
"L -111 
= 
= 
= 
= 
' 
1 - f * f s} / 
1 - f ~ s )w ~ ( s) [ 
_) 
(1) 
Laplace transform of f(t) 
failure-probability-density-distribution 
Laplace transform of w(t) 
repair-probability-density-distribution 
complex variable in the Laplace-domain 
antitransformation to the time domain 
"*" indicates Laplace transformation 
We introduce also the failure probability cumulative distribution 
"F"(t) given by 
t 
F(t) = j f(t)dt 
0 
(2) 
Now we shall show how to obtain eq. 1. The availability A can be cal-
culated by summing the probabilities "P{E]' of all the mutually 
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exclusive events 11 En11 so defined 
We get 
A = 
p r the plant has failed 11 n11 tim~s 
and been repaired "n" times j 
1 P {E 7_ 
n=o n ..!:> 
We can write the following expressions for the various P {En]. 
t 
(3) 
(4) 
1- jf(t)dt (5) p i_ E l p I. plant has never failed until t} = 1_the = 0 \ 
-· 
0 
p f El} = p fthe plant has failed at " t " has (., 1 , 
been repaired at"t2" and has not 
failed between "t2" and 
II t" } ::::: 
The Laplace transforms of eqs. 5 and 6 a1•e 
P« f E } * 1 f (s) = l 0 p (7) 
and [+ - ~l] * ~ p*{El ] = f (s) w (s) (8) 
By an iterated application of the convolution theorem for Laplace transforms, 
we get for the Laplace-transform of P{ En} defined in (3) 
p *{EJ = [ ~ _ ris) J -Gts)w 1s) T (9) 
Substituting P*°{En 1into eq. (4) we get 
* 
n=• 
A = I: 
n=O 
Eq. 10 can be written as follows: 
* A (a) = 
s 
1 
w*(s) 
r * * l n 1_f (s )w (s) _ (lo) 
(11) 
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and finally antitransforming 
n * J A(t) _ L-1 l 1-f (s~ - s 1-:r.i'(s w'*(s) (12) 
A 6.3 Calculation of the asymptotic ~vailability AO(!> 
For t-:>oo"A(t)li approaches a limit "A•" which is largely used for many 
practical case$. It is given by 
lim A(t) = Aot,, = 
t~co 
where 
"Aoo" 
II ~ 11 
II 't' !I 
= 
= 
= 
asymptotic availability 
average failure rate 
average repair rate 
From eq. 1 para A 6.2 we get for t "? 00 
lim A = 
t-,ao 
We have 
lim L-1 { 1-f * 
s(l-f*w *) 
~eo 
* lim f = 
t 
lim __f'f(t)dt = 1 
t~- 0 s~ o 
and 
lim w* 
s~ o 
t 
lim J w(t)dt = 1 
t?9IOO 
(1) 
lim r 1-f *J 
S-? 0 -
um I i-fY°'w *J 
s~o -
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
3 4 J "' J Eqs. and indicate that de 1 HOpital s rule has to be used to evaluate 
the limit of eq. 2. We have 
lim A = 
t~Oc, (5) 
- rn -
We have 
and 
* lim elf /ds 
s+o 
.. 
lim dw /ds = 
= 
t l 
- lim _(tt{t}dt = - ,, 
t ~.00 T 
t 1 
- lim J'tw(t)dt = - \tl 
t~..oo t 
Putting 6 and 7 into 5, we get 
Aoo = lim A = 
4c. 
A 6.4 Calculation of the instantaneous failure rate"\" 
We call instantaneous failure rate, "~",the quantity defined 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
P the plant is up at "t" and fails before "t+dt" 
P the plant is up at "t (1) 
We shall calculate"\" as function of the failure-probability-density-
distribution, "f(t)", and of the repair-probability-density-distribution 
"w(t)". The denominator of eq. 1 is the point availability"A" given by 
eq.1 of para. A 6.1. 
We have to calculate the numerator of eq. 1, that is the probability of 
event "E" so defined 
P [E} = P fthe plant is up at "t" and fails before "t+dt1- (2) 
To do this, we sum all the probabilities "P f En} of the following mutual-
ly exclusive events 
where n = o, 1, 2, 
P ~the plant has failed n-times and has been 
repaired n-times before "t" and fails again 
before II t+dt11 } (3) 
With a procedure similar to that developed in para A 6.2, we can calculate 
the probability of the event "E" defined by 
n 
P .[En1- dt • L-l $-f(s)w*/s)] °[1 - ( 4) 
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where the asterisk 1~' denotes the Laplace transform, and L-l indicates 
antitrasformation to the time domain. 
We add all terms given by eq. 4 to get P f Ej 
P (E) ~ dtL-1[i- -rys~ i:;~-?'(s)w 1s)J {5) 
Finally we get 
* J 1-f (s~ 1-f*(s wx-(s) (6) 
Putting eq. 2 of para A 1.1 ( the availability 11 ~') and eq. 6 into equa-
tion 1, we get * ) 
X = L-l (i_;,.,~:l w•(s) . 
f -1 ( 1 1-f*ts) } 
L s 1-f* s )w:llt'(s) 
A 6.5 Calculation of the instantaneous repair rate 11X 11 w 
(7) 
We call instantaneous repair rate the quantity "X ", so defined 
w 
X . dt == w P the plant is down at "t" and is repaired before" t+dt" P { the plant is down at 't' 
(1) 
We shall calculate 11 X11 as function of the failure-probability-density-
w 
distribution, "f(t)" and ,of the repair-probability-density-distribution 
11w(t)". The denominator of eq. l is equal to 11 1-A" (where "A" is the 
availability, given by eq. 1 of para. A 6.1), 
The numerator of eq. 1 is the probability of the event "E" 
P { E} == P { the plant is down at "t" and is repaired 
before II t+dt"} 
P { E} will be obtained by aumma tion of all the probabilities 
mutually exclusive events "E II defined as follows: 
n 
(2) 
of the 
P ~the plant has failed n-times and has been repaired 
(n-1) times before "t" and is repaired again before 
II t+dt11 } (3) 
where n = 1, 2, 3 ........ . 
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With procedure similar to that developed in para. A 6.2 and A 6.4, we 
f 7 1 \ * -. - ~ 1f Jn ,., 
P ~(.EnJ= dt L- lf (s)w(s) l_f (s)w (s) _ J ( 4) 
We add all terms givenby eq. 4 and ~e get 
(5) 
Taking into account eq. 5 and eq. 1 of para. A 6.2, eq.l becomes 
= (6) 
A 6.6 Calculation of the asymtotic values of nxtt and u:x" f w 
From eq. 8 of para A 6.4 we get 
(1) 
The limit at the denominator of eq. 1 has already been calculated in 
para A 6.3. We have 
1 
lim -
s~o 
8 
where 
and 
~ 1-f '(s) 
l -f34:" ( s )vt,t:' ( s ) 
V = 
= 
(2) 
1 (3) 
eO 
Jtw(t)dt 
0 
1 (4) 
_[tf(t)dt 
0 
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For the numerator we have to apply the rule of 1eftiHopital. We have 
*' s j= [ ;i, dw !., + w ~# di"' J lim f (s) 1-fK(s )wi.l'(s) - lim ~o ~ f ds ds-
= o/v 
~ + 'i 
Putting eqs. 5 and 2 into eq. 1, we get finally 
1im X 
t~ QC f 
= V 
With analogous procedure it is possible to verify that 
um X =Y 
t~ w 
A 6.7 Conclusions 
= 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
The conclusions, which we can draw at the end of this appendix, are 
very general and very important. If we have a plant (or a subsystem 
or a unit) with failure and repair probability density distributions res-
pectively f(t) and w(t), the asymptotic values of the point availability 
"A", of the failure rate "i'." and of the repair rate 11 )(;;.;/' are the follow-
ing 
lim A = AQ) = 
t~ CB (1) 
lim X = V t70o f (2) 
lim X = y t~co w (3) 
Where 
1 
oe j tw(t)dt 
0 
(4) 
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and 
-V= 1 
itf(t)dt (5) 
For the unavailability U we get from eq. 1 
U = 1-A oo = (6~ 
This means that, for long periods of time (t ->oo ), any system (plant-
or subsystem or unit) behaves as if it has a failure and repair proba-
bility density distributions both exponential with failure and repair 
rates given respectively ty eqs. 4 and 5, 
This property of the asymptotic behaviour of the systems allows us 
to extend many results obtained with exponential distributions to 
cases where the distributions are not exponential. 
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15. Appendix 7: Calculation of the average failure rate of a functional subsysteo 
for different strategies 
A 7. l Functional subsystem consisting of two units one working and the other in 
stand-by - No preventive maintenance 
This case has been called "strate:;y 211 in para. 5.4. If ·we call with "A" and 
"B" the two units'} the functional subsystem "F'1 can be in one of the below 
listed states 
State "011 "Ali in operation and ":3" in stand-by or 
"A" in stand-by and "E11 in operation 
State 11 111 "A" in operation and "B" in repair or 
"B" in operation a.nd 11A" in repair 
State "2" Both unit failed and subsystem therefore also failed. 
The subsystern start with a unit "A" in operation and the other "B" in stand-by 
(State 110"). If "A" fails'} it is automatically switched off; while "B" is auto-
matically switched into operation (State t). The failed unit i!A" is repaired 
and, when the repair is completed'} will be connected as stand-by unit (State O). 
The subsystem will fail if the uorking unit fails before the repair of the other 
is completed (State 2). 
The reliability "'Rr" of the subsystem "F" will be obtained by Sllllnlling the following 
probabilities "P "of the belou listed mutually exclusive events i 
P = P { A is not failed at 11 t 11 } 
0 
(1) 
P 1 = P { A is failed at "t1" and n is not failed at "t" } (2) 
0 < tl < t 
P2 = P {A is failed at 11t 111 ; A is repaired before B fails;} 
'B fails at "t/; A is not failed at "t" (3) 
0 < tl < t2 < t 
Pi = P fA is failed at 11 t 1
11
; A is repaired before B fails} 
1 • • • • • B fails at nti"; A is not failed at 11 t11 ( 4) 
0 < tl < t2 ••••• < ti < t 
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We indicate with hF(t) and gF(t} respectively the failure and repair probability 
density distributions of each of the two units. The two cumulative distributions 
will be 
ll'{t) = lt hF(t)dt 
0 
and 
GF{t) =f 8p(t)dt 
We c:an write 
p 
= ,-f hFdt = I - HF(t) 0 
PJ =lt hF(tl) 
0 
rt-II (t-t >J dt F I I 
The Laplace transforms of eqs. 7, 8 and 9 are the following 
* l hF{s) 
where 
p* = - - ~-
0 S S 
s = complex variable of the Laplace domain 
11
*" indicates Laplace transform 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(10) 
( 11) 
( t 2) 
* Looking at eqs. 10, 11 and 12, one can easily derive for P
1 
the followinr, 
expression 
* 
* ( I hF \ * r Ji -I P. = - - - : h : (h G ) 
1. s s/:?LFF {13) 
The Laplace transform. of the reliability P~ can then be easily calculated 
(lC) 
r; = I: p* 
i=l i 
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1 
= -
s 
The average failure rate "'Ap" of subsystem "F" is given by 
From eq. 14 we have 
Now we have 
* lim ~
;! 
s-+o 
* lt lim hF = lim hFdt = 1 
s-+o t-+ClO o 
Taking into account eq. 17' eq. 16 becomes 
+ I ·liln liln ~ C [ s-+o 1-lim(hFGF) s-+o 
s-+o 
Applying the theorem of de L'Hopital, we get 
1-h* * 
F dhF lim Jt t lim- = - lim-= 
s ds t-+ClO 0 s-+o s-+o 
* 1-h F 
s 
hFdt 
where 110F" is the average failure rate of a unit. 
1 
=-
a,.. 
.i.! 
Taking into account eqs. 18 and 19j eq. 15 becomes finally 
oF >,.'!? = ___ ..,;;;... ___ _ 
" 
Let us consider the particular case in which hF(t) is exponential 
Taking into account eq. 21 ~ we can write 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
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and 
lim (hPGF)* = l00crF exp(-cr~t)G~(t)dt = 
s-+o ... o .. c 
= [exp(-oFt)GF(t)]~ + l~e,q,(-oFt)gF(t)dt = 
= l~•xp(-oFt)r;.,,(t)dt 
Taking into account eq. 23, eq. 20 becom~s in this particular case 
cr~ 
t Au = ---------:-------
.! 
1 + ---------
If gF(t) too is exponential 
eF(t) = JJ? exp(-µFt) 
we have 
Taking into account P.q. 26~ eq. 24 becomes 
Since µF/crF is usually very large~ we zet from eq. 27 
cr2 
A :::, ...!_ 
F µp 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
It is very interesting to notice that eq. 28 holds approximately also in the 
case in which gT.'l(t) is r..ot exponential. In this case 11µ " is defined as averaee ~ ~ 
repair rate 
(29) 
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We have, developing exp(-oFt) in a Taylor series 
If we stop the series at the first tenni we e;et from eq_. 30 
Putting 31 in eq. 24, ue get 
Q'p 
>.. ::: -
F 1 + µF/aF 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
A 7.2 Functional subsystem consisting of two units, one Horking and the other 
in stand-by. Preventive maintenance. 
This case has been called strategy 3 in para. 5.4. 
Eq. 24 of para. A 7.1 is approximately valid where "ap" is the average failure 
rate defined by eq. 1 of para. 2. 
Eq. 33 of para. A 7.1 can also be used, where "µp" is the average repair rate 
defined by eq. 29 of para. A 7.1. 
A 7. 3 Functional subsystem consisting of "nFlt units; 11k II Of F these units are 
~-mrking and the other nF-kF are in stand-by (Strate~ies 4 and 5 of pera. 
If one of the working units fails, it is automatically switched off, while the 
first of the "nF-~" stand-by units is at the same time automatically switched 
into operation. The failed unit is repaired, and then connected as last of the 
stand-by units. If a second unit fails, the second of the stand-by units is 
switched into operation, and so on. 
The subsystem fails if nF-kF+l units are failed. The subsyste~ can be at time 
"t" in one of the belm1 listed states (fig. 26). 
5 • .:.) 
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Number of Number of Number of State working stand-by failed Comments units units units 
0 kF n -k 0 F -'"F 
I k nF-kF-l l F 
2 k.,.., n -1· -? 2 l: F '"F -
• . . . 
. 0 . . . . 
i kr;, n -k -i i F F 
0 . . . 
. . 
0 . . . 
n -k -I kF I n,.,-k -I F F 
r' F 
nF-kF l, 0 nF-kF ''"F 
nF-kF+! ~ l• -1 0 
~~-k +I Subsystem failed ' ··p 
- F 
. 
We shall suppose that the failure and repair probability density distributions 
are both exponential 
(1) 
and 
g = µ exp(-µ t) F F F 
with crF and µF both constant. 
(2) 
We indicate with Qi (t) the probability that the subsystem "F" is in state "i". 
We can write the following 11nF-kF+2" equations 
(3) 
(4) 
• 
(5) 
Since 
dO -k +1 
-nF F 
dt 
nF-kF+l 
I: Qi= 1 
i=o 
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only "n -k +1" of the "n -k +2" equations are independent. F F F F 
The associated initial conditions are 
Q (O) = 1 
0 
and 
Q. (0) = 0 
1 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
Taking into account the initial conditions 9 and 10? the Laplace transforms of 
eqs. 3 to 7 a.re 
where 
0 - , o* 
- L(F°F·{ k 
·n - • 
. F F 
s = complex variable of the Laplace domain 
"*" indicates La!_)lace transform 
(11} 
(12) 
(13} 
(14) 
(15) 
!J. 
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The Laplace transform of the reliability "r\/' of subsystem "F" is given by 
* =l- * ~ (' s ·n -k +J F F (16) 
Takine; into account eq. 15, eq. 16 becomes 
1 
- kFcrF 0* 
* 
·11F-kF 
P. = 
']' s (17) 
Now we have 
where 
A 
t ~ (nF-kF+t) 
!J. (18) 
!J. = determinant of the coefficients of the first "n -k +1 11 equations 
F F 
(eq. 15 excluded) 
A 
1; (nF-k...,+l) 
' r 
= determinant complementary to the element 11a 11 
l;(nF-kF+l) ~ 
(1st line and "n -k +l"th column) of the determinant 11 /J. 11 • F F 
The determinant !J., having "nF-kF+l" lines and nF-kF+l cohnnns, is written below 
(eq. 19). 
= 
-(kFcrF+s) 
kFcrF 
0 
0 
0 
0 
µF 
-(kFcrF+µF+s) 
kFcrF 
0 
0 
0 
() . . . . . . . 
µF • . • . . 
-(kPcrF+µF+s) •••• 
kFcrF . . . . 
0 
0 
00000-00 
I) 0 0 
0 () 0 
0 0 0 
. . . . . . . 0 . . . 
0 
. 
Taking into account eq. 18~ eq. 17 becomes 
!J. - k crP A ( ) F .. I; nF-kF+l 
P.* = ---------
-'p s!J. (20) 
19) 
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* On the other hand 11Rc" is also given by 
,.., 
nF-k.,.,.+1 
- * 
E (\ 
i=o 
(21) 
By solving the system of eqs. 11 to 14, we get 
A Q: = ( -1) i - ! i (22) 
tihere 11611 is the determinant defined by eq. 19 and nA11" is the determinant 
complementary to the element 11a " (1st line and "i"th column) of 6. 1i 
Putting 22 in 21, we obtain 
n -k +1 F Ti' 
E - (-l)i Ali 
n* = .;;;i_=..;;.l _____ _ 
r,s 
By comparing eqs. 21 and 20 1 we get 
s 
(23) 
= (24) 
By extracting the determinant A from 6 (eq. 19), one obtains 
l;(nF-kF+t) 
(np-k-r+l) 
= (-1) ,; 
Putting 25 in 24 for s=O, one 3e.ts 
[6] s=o 
The average failure rate 11 >.. " of subsystem 11F11 is given by F 
= --'---
* lim P-,.. 
s-+o -
Takine into account eqs. 23 and 26, ue 3et 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
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By extracting the detenninants "Au 11 from 6 (eq. 19) lJe obtain for s=o 
n -k +l-i (-i) F F 
Taking into account eq. 29, eq. 28 becomes 
(30) 
In the particular case kp=J (only one unit working)
1 
eq. 30 becomes 
Since µF/oF is usually very large, we can have 
expressions derived from eqs. 30 and 31 
A = F 
(l~oF) 
nF-kF+l 
(31) 
the two following approximate 
(32) 
(33) 
(28) 
For analogy with what we have found for the case of two units in para. A 7.J, 
eqs. 32 and 33 should be valid also in the case in which "o" is an average 
F 
failure distribution given by eq. I of para. 2 (with any type of failure distri-
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bution), and µFis given by 
µ =------
F looot gF(t)dt 
(34) 
with gF(t) being also hot essentialiy exponential. 
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16. Appendix 8: Calculation of the exoected number of non preventive replacements 
(or repairs) carried out_ 1.!':_~3ab1_~Efttc'.l.n(:e period of a un.it 
belonginp. to a functi~nal subsystem. 
In this appendix we want to calculate the expected number rixF 11 of non preventive 
replacements (or repairs) cartied cut in one maintenance period ue" of a unit F 
belonging to a functionai subsystem (eq. 7 of para. 5.7). 
We indicate with hF(t) the failure probability density distribution of a unit. 
He indicate with Pi (t) the probability that Iii" units have failed (and therefore 
replaced) before time 11 t 11 and that the 111+1 11 unit is workine. 
He have 
where 
The Laplace transforms of eqs. 1~ 2 and 3 are 
$.E hF<s) 
p* = .!.. -
0 S S 
( I) 
(2) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
where "*" indicates Laplace transform, ~md "s" is the complex variable of the 
Laplace domain. 
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Looking at the eqs. 5, 6 and 7~ we cah easily derive the following equation 
Antitrarl~fbtming eq. 8 to the time domain, we get 
p = L-1 f -~;(s)Ji - ~;(s)]i+i } 
i ) s s 
l.. 
where L-l indicates antitransformation to the time domain. 
The expected number "x (t)" of failed units at time "t 11 is given by F 
(8) 
(9) 
* 
x ( t) = ; i P. = ; L- l { .!. [ h: { s)] i - .!. [ h: { s)] i + I } = L - l {_!_ hF (:) } ( 10) 
F i=o 1 i=o 5 ·· 5 - s 1-h,.,(s) 
J! 
Eq. JO can be written as follows 
(11) 
For t=0F' we get finally 
(12) 
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17. Appendix 9: Calculation of the expected number of non preventive replacements 
(or repairs) carried out in one main~enance period of a unit 
belonging to a safety subsystem. 
Ue indicate with h~(t) and h~(t) the two failure probability density distri-
butions respectively for failure type 11a'1 and type nb 11 • 
The two modified failure probability distributions" which take into account the 
on-off-cycling due to the checks with checking periods "•s"~ are respectively 
(eqs. 3 and 4 of Appendix 2) 
~ + ::) hS to+-:: J (I) 
( o') t o" l I + 2. h~ t(l+ -2) 
\ 's ·:) _ r s J 
and 
(2) 
where 11 t" is still the real time and os and o; are two constants. 
Taking into account eqs. land 2, the total failure probability density distri-
bution h(t,r5) will be 
(3) 
Taking into account eq. 3, with procedure similar to that developed in Appendix 8, 
we get the expected number "xs" of units failed in one maintenance period "es" 
(eq. 12 of para. 5.7) 
where 
L-I indicates antitransfonnation to the time domain 
"*" indicates Laplace transformation 
11s 11 is the complex variable of the Laplace domain. 
(4) 
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